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Abstract
In the arena of automated negotiations we focus on the principal negotiation protocol in bilateral settings, i.e. the alternating-
offers protocol. In the scientific community it is common the idea that bargaining in the alternating-offers protocol will play a
crucial role in the automation of electronic transactions. Notwithstanding its prominence, literature does not present a satisfactory
solution to the alternating-offers protocol in real-world settings, e.g. in presence of uncertainty. In this paper we game theoretically
analyze this negotiation problem with one-sided uncertain deadlines and we provide an efficient solving algorithm. Specifically,
we analyze the situation where the values of the parameters of the buyer are uncertain to the seller, whereas the parameters of the
seller are common knowledge (the analysis of the reverse situation is analogous). In this particular situation the results present in
literature are not satisfactory, since they do not assure the existence of an equilibrium for every value of the parameters. From our
game theoretical analysis we find two choice rules that apply an action and a probability distribution over the actions, respectively,
to every time point and we find the conditions on the parameters such that each choice rule can be singularly employed to produce
an equilibrium. These conditions are mutually exclusive. We show that it is always possible to produce an equilibrium where the
actions, at any single time point, are those prescribed either by the first choice rule or by the second one. We exploit this result
for developing a solving algorithm. The proposed algorithm works backward by computing the equilibrium from the last possible
deadline of the bargaining to the initial time point and by applying at each time point the actions prescribed by the choice rule whose
conditions are satisfied. The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm is asymptotically independent of the number of
types of the player whose deadline is uncertain. With linear utility functions, it is O(m · T ) where m is the number of the issues
and T is the length of the bargaining.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Automated negotiation is a promising scenario of computer science where artificial intelligence can play a crucial
role: it can automate software agents allowing them to negotiate each other on behalf of users for buying and selling
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1120 N. Gatti et al. / Artificial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1119–1157items [21]. This automation, as stated in literature, can lead to more effective negotiations since software agents work
faster than humans and are more prone in finding efficient agreements [35].
Several negotiation settings can be found in the electronic commerce arena. The most common ones are usually
bilateral: a buyer and a seller negotiate a contract over one or more issues. In this paper we consider the principal
setting in bilateral negotiations: the bargaining [28]. In a bargaining two agents must reach an agreement regarding
how to distribute objects or a monetary amount and each player prefers to reach an agreement, rather than abstain
from doing so; however, each agent prefers that agreement which most favors her interests. A real-world example that
depicts this situation is a negotiation between a service provider and a customer over the price and the quality level of
a service.
Classically, the study of bargaining is carried out employing game-theoretical tools [28,30] wherein one distin-
guishes the negotiation protocol and the negotiation strategies: the protocol sets the negotiation rules, specifying
which actions are allowed and when [32]; the strategies define the behavior of an agent in any possible agent’s deci-
sion node. Strategies can be pure or mixed.1 For any decision node of the game a pure strategy prescribes one action;
a mixed strategy prescribes probability distributions over the actions. Given a protocol, the game-theoretical approach
postulates that rational agents should employ strategies that maximize their payoffs [29]. In this paper we a priori
assume agents to be rational; such an assumption will be supported a posteriori by the results provided in the paper.
Indeed, we will show that the problem of computing a solution with rational agents is tractable.
The principal protocol for bilateral bargaining, the alternating-offers protocol, pioneered by Ståhl in [37], has
reached an outstanding place in literature thanks to Rubinstein in [33]. It is considered to be the most satisfactory
model of bargaining present in literature. Basically, an agent starts by offering a value for the issue under dispute
(e.g., a price) to her opponent. The opponent can accept the offer or make a counteroffer. If a counteroffer is made,
the process is repeated until one of the agents accepts. Rubinstein’s alternating-offers model is not accurate enough
to capture all the aspects involved in the electronic commercial transactions, where, typically, agents have reservation
values and deadlines, negotiate over multiple issues, and have uncertain information. Therefore, refinements and
extensions of [33] are commonly employed in computer science community to provide a more satisfactory model [10].
Examples of real-world applications that employ bargaining techniques can be found in [1,2,24,26,31].
The solution of the classic Rubinstein’s protocol is well known in the literature [28]. On the contrary, the study of
the alternating-offers protocol in presence of extensions and refinements is hard and still open. Specifically, the two
crucial problems concern the development of algorithmic techniques to find equilibria in presence of issue multiplic-
ity and information incompleteness. The problem of bargaining efficiently over multiple issues when information is
complete has been recently addressed in [6,7] and refined in [12]. The equilibrium strategies can be easily computed
by extending the classic backward induction method [14]. The computational complexity is O(m · T ), where m is the
number of issues and T is the length of the bargaining. In presence of incomplete information, it is customary in game
theory to introduce probability distributions over the parameters that are not known by the agents. Notwithstanding,
the analysis of bargaining with uncertain information is currently more a series of examples than a coherent set of
results. Game theory provides an appropriate solution concept for extensive-form games with uncertain information,
i.e., the sequential equilibrium [22], but no solving technique to find it. We recall that the backward induction method
can be employed with success exclusively in presence of complete information [14]. Moreover, economic studies
only provide equilibria in very narrow settings of information uncertainty, focusing mainly on discount factors and
reservation values. For instance, in [34] Rubinstein analyzes a scenario with uncertainty over two possible discount
factors of one of the two agents, while in [3] Chatterjee and Samuelson analyze a scenario with uncertainty over the
reservation values of both the buyer and the seller, where each player can be of two types. An interested reader can
find an exhaustive survey on bargaining with uncertain information in [4].
The employment of the alternating-offers protocol in electronic commerce has put attention on the role of the
deadlines in the negotiation. The infinite horizon assumption, which is usually made in game theory literature, is
not realistic in real-world applications [36]. Furthermore, agents’ deadlines are usually uncertain, not being known
a priori by the agents themselves. Notwithstanding the importance of uncertain deadlines in negotiations, only few
works have deeply analyzed their effects in the alternating-offers protocol with discount factors, discrete time, and
rational agents, and no satisfactory solution is currently known. This prevents the employment of autonomous rational
1 For the sake of simplicity, we use in the paper, as Kreps and Wilson in [22], the term “strategies” in the place of appropriate game theoretical
term “behavioral strategies”.
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Classic results concerning the presence of deadlines in bargaining are the followings. In [25] Ma and Manove consider
a complete information finite horizon alternating-offers model without temporal discounting with continuous time and
players’ option of strategic delay. In [13] Fershtman and Seidmann study a complete information bargaining model
with random proposer and a deadline. In [16] Gneezy et al. study a variation of the ultimatum game. In [36] Sandholm
and Vulkan analyze a slight variation of the war-of-attrition game: the surplus can be divided, time is continuous, the
deadlines are uncertain, and there are not discount factors. In [10] Fatima et al. study the alternating-offers protocol
with uncertainty over deadlines and reservation values in presence of bounded rational agents: more precisely, agents
must employ predefined bidding tactics based on the negotiation decision functions paradigm [8]. Only recently some
attempts have been made in computer science community to achieve the solution of the alternating-offers protocol
with uncertain deadlines and rational agents. The first attempt is by Fatima et al. in [11], where they present an
algorithm that produces equilibrium strategies in presence of two-sided uncertainty. Their algorithm searches in the
space of the strategies finding equilibria in pure strategies in time linear in the length of the bargaining and polynomial
in the number of agents’ types. However, bargaining with only pure strategies in the alternating-offers protocol with
uncertain deadlines is not satisfactory, since, as showed in [5], for some values of the parameters there is not any
equilibrium in pure strategies. As it is customary in game theory, such a problem can be overtaken by resorting to
mixed strategies; we recall indeed that any game admits at least one sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies by
Kreps and Wilson’s theorem [22].
In this paper we game theoretically study the problem of bargaining one issue in the alternating-offers protocol
with one-sided uncertainty over deadlines and we provide an efficient algorithm to compute it. Exactly, we analyze
the situation where the values of the parameters of the buyer are uncertain to the seller, whereas the parameters of the
seller are common knowledge (the analysis of the reverse situation is analogous). We show also how our result can
be easily extended to the multiple issue situation exploiting the result presented in [6]. The extension of our result to
the two-sided situation is not easy instead, and it will be explored in future works. From our game theoretical analysis
we find two choice rules that apply an action and a probability distribution over the actions, respectively, to each
time point and we find the conditions on the parameters such that each choice rule can be singularly employed to
produce an equilibrium.2 These conditions are mutually exclusive. We show that it is always possible to produce an
equilibrium where the actions at any single time point are those prescribed either by the first choice rule or by the
second one. We exploit this result for developing a solving algorithm. Differently from [11,12], our algorithm does
not search for the optimal actions of the agents at each time point among all the available ones, but it applies the
actions prescribed by the choice rule whose conditions are satisfied. The computational complexity of our algorithm
is asymptotically independent of the number of types of the agent whose deadline is uncertain, being O(m · T ) where
m is the number of issues and T is the length of the bargaining. The two choice rules we present are not the only ones
that can be employed to produce an equilibrium. Indeed, since the alternating-offers protocol with uncertain deadlines
admits more equilibria, other choice rules could be employed. The choice rules we propose have the peculiarity to
produce only one equilibrium for all the values of the parameters and guarantee that there is not any other set of choice
rules that allows one for computing faster the solution through dynamic programming techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the alternating-offers model and the solution with complete
information. Section 3 states the problem introducing the appropriate solution concept and the solutions currently
available in the state of the art. Sections 4 and 5 game theoretically analyze the alternating-offers protocol with
one-sided uncertainty over deadlines in pure strategies and mixed strategies, respectively. Section 6 presents our
solving algorithm and shows how it can be extended to the multiple issue situation. Section 7 concludes the paper. In
Appendix A we report the proofs of the main theoretical results and in Appendix B we report the formulas to compute
the equilibrium mixed strategy in presence of more than two types.
2. Complete information alternating-offers
In this section we review the basis of the alternating-offers protocol with deadlines, in order to introduce notations,
models, and techniques. We present (Section 2.1) the model of the alternating-offers bargaining with deadlines and
(Section 2.2) its known solution with complete information.
2 The first choice rule has been preliminarily presented in [5].
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We study a discrete time finite horizon alternating-offers bargaining protocol on one continuous issue (e.g., a price).
Formally, the buyer agent b and the seller agent s can act at times t ∈ N. The player function ι : N → {b, s} returns
the agent that acts at time point t and is such that ι(t) = ι(t + 1). Possible actions σ tι(t) of agent ι(t) at any time point
t > 0 are:
(i) offer(x), where x ∈R is the value of the issue to negotiate,
(ii) exit,
(iii) accept,
whereas at time point t = 0 the only allowed actions are (i) and (ii). If σ tι(t) = accept the bargaining stops and the
outcome is (x, t), where x is the value such that σ t−1ι(t−1) = offer(x). This is to say that the agents agree on the value
x at time point t . If σ tι(t) = exit the bargaining stops and the outcome is NoAgreement. Otherwise the bargaining
continues to the next time point.
Each agent i has an utility function Ui : (R×N)∪ {NoAgreement} → R, that represents her gain over the possible
bargaining outcomes. Each utility function Ui depends on three parameters of agent i:
• the reservation price RPi ∈R+,
• the temporal discount factor δi ∈ (0,1],
• the deadline Ti ∈N, Ti > 0.
More precisely, if the outcome of the bargaining is an agreement (x, t), then the utility functions Ub and Us are
respectively:
Ub(x, t) =
{
(RPb − x) · (δb)t if t  Tb
−1 otherwise
Us(x, t) =
{
(x − RPs) · (δs)t if t  Ts
−1 otherwise
If the outcome is NoAgreement, then Ub(NoAgreement) = Us(NoAgreement) = 0. Notice that the assignment of a
strictly negative value (we have chosen by convention the value −1) to Ui after agent i’s deadline allows one to
capture the essence of the deadline concept: an agent, after her deadline, strictly prefers to exit the negotiation rather
than to reach any agreement.
According to classic works in literature, we assume the feasibility of the agreement, i.e., RPb > RPs, and the
rationality of the agents, i.e., it is common knowledge that each agent will act to maximize her utility.
2.2. Complete information solution
When the information is complete the appropriate solution concept for a game like the one we are dealing with
is the subgame perfect equilibrium [18]. Rigorously speaking, the protocol described above is not a finite horizon
game: the deadlines are not in the protocol, but in the agent’s utility functions, and the agents are allowed to offer
and counteroffer also after their deadlines have expired. Nevertheless, it is essentially a finite horizon game: a rational
agent will give up bargaining after her deadline. Therefore, subgame perfect equilibrium strategies can be found
employing the backward induction method [14]. In what follows we informally summarize the backward induction
construction (see [28] for more details).
The presence of deadlines in the agents’ utility functions induces a time point T where the game, if it is rationally
played, stops. This time point is the earliest of the two deadlines, formally, T = min{Tb, Ts}. Indeed, after T no agent
can gain positive utility by bargaining, being NoAgreement the equilibrium outcome of the subgame starting from
t = T . The peculiarity of the time point T with respect to any other time point t < T is that the optimal action agent
ι(T ) can make, if she does not accept her opponent’s offer, is to make exit. Instead, at any time point t < T the agents
strictly prefer to make an offer rather than to make exit. From time point t = T − 1 back, the optimal actions of agent
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offer that gives agent ι(t + 1) the same utility of making at t + 1 her best offer, if t < T − 1, and exit, if t = T − 1.
We denote such an offer by x∗(t). In the second step, we find the offers made by agent ι(t − 1) at t − 1 that agent ι(t)
would accept at t : they are all the offers that give agent ι(t) an utility equal to or greater than offering x∗(t). The rule
whereby agent ι(t) chooses her optimal action at t is therefore: if t = T , she accepts any offer that gives her an utility
equal to or greater than zero, otherwise she makes exit, and, if t < T , she accepts any offer that gives her an utility
equal to or greater than offering x∗(t), otherwise she offers x∗(t).
For the sake of simplicity, let ι(T ) = s; the backward induction construction with ι(T ) = b is analogous. The
unique equilibrium outcome of the subgame starting from time point t = T is NoAgreement, since s makes exit. Being
zero the utility of NoAgreement, s would accept any offer made by b at t = T − 1 that gives her an utility equal to or
greater than zero. Formally, she accepts any offer y such that Us(y, T ) 0, namely, y  RPs.
Consider the subgame starting from time point t = T − 1. The optimal offer x∗(T − 1) which b can make is RPs.
Such an offer leads to the agreement (RPs, T ), which gives b an utility greater than the utility of the outcome she
would reach in the subgame starting from t = T , i.e., NoAgreement, while s is indifferent between NoAgreement and
(RPs, T ). It can be easily observed that all the other available actions lead to outcomes that give b an utility strictly
lower than offering RPs. More precisely, any other offer y that s would accept gives b a utility lower than offering
RPs, being y > RPs; any offer that s would not accept gives b an utility of zero, since s will exit; and exit gives
b zero. Therefore, b would accept at t = T − 1 any offer that gives her an utility equal to or greater than offering
RPs, otherwise she offers RPs. Formally, she accepts any offer y such that Ub(y, T − 1)  Ub(RPs, T ), namely,
y  RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb.
Consider the subgame starting from time point t = T − 2. The optimal offer x∗(T − 2) which s can make is
RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb. Such an offer leads to the agreement (RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb, T − 1) which gives s an utility
greater than the utility of the outcome she would reach in the subgame starting from t = T − 1, i.e. (RPs, T ), while b
is indifferent between (RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb, T − 1) and (RPs, T ). The utility Us(RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb, T − 1)
is positive, since, being δb ∈ (0,1), it holds RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb > RPs. Also in this case, as it happens in the
subgame starting from t = T − 1, all the other available actions give s an utility strictly lower than offering RPb −
(RPb − RPs)δb. Therefore, s would accept at t = T − 2 any offer that gives her an utility equal to or greater than
offering RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb, otherwise she offers RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb. Formally, she accepts any offer y such
that Us(y, T − 2)Us(RPb − (RPb − RPs)δb, T − 1), namely, y  RPs + (RPb − RPs)(1 − δb)δs.
This reasoning can be inductively carried back to the beginning of the game producing a sequence of agreements
(x∗(t), t + 1)s where each agreement (x∗(t), t + 1) is the equilibrium outcome of the subgame starting from time
point t . Due to the presence of the discount factors, this sequence has the property that at each time point t it holds
Uι(t)(x
∗(t), t + 1) > Uι(t)(x∗(t + 1), t + 2) and Uι(t+1)(x∗(t), t + 1) = Uι(t+1)(x∗(t + 1), t + 2). On the equilibrium
path the agents agree at time point t = 1, since agent ι(0) offers x∗(0) at t = 0 and agent ι(1) accepts it at t = 1.
In order to provide a recursive formula for x∗(t), we introduce the notion of backward propagation, whose defini-
tion is independent of the protocol we are studying.
Definition 1. Given x ∈R and agent i ∈ {b, s}, we call one-step backward propagation of x along the isoutility curves
of i the value x←i ∈ R such that Ui(x←i , t − 1) = Ui(x, t) for any time t ∈ {1, . . . , Ti}. (The notion is well defined
because x←i does not depend on the choice of t ∈ {1, . . . , Ti}.) Given x ∈ R and a sequence s = 〈i1, i2, . . . , in〉 ∈
{b, s}n, we call backward propagation of x along the curves of s the value x←s ∈R such that
x←s =
{
(x←s′)←in where s′ = 〈i1, i2, . . . , in−1〉 if n > 1
x←i1 if n = 1
Two examples of multi-step propagations are x←〈b,s〉 = (x←b)←s and x←〈b,s,b〉 = ((x←b)←s)←b. For multi-step
propagations we usually employ a shorter notation for repeated subsequences of agents; for example, x←b3[bs] stands
for x←〈b,b,s,b,s,b,s〉.
On the basis of the notion of backward propagation the values of x∗(t) can be easily defined as follows:
x∗(t − 1) =
{
RPι(t) if t = T
(x∗(t)) if t < T←ι(t)
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offer x∗(t) that ι(t) can make is marked; the dashed lines are isoutility curves.
where the formulas to compute (x∗(t))←b and (x∗(t))←s are: (x∗(t))←b = RPb − (RPb − x∗(t))δb and (x∗(t))←s =
RPs + (x∗(t) − RPs)δs.
Fig. 1 shows an example of backward induction construction with RPb = 1, RPs = 0, δb = 0.7, δs = 0.7, Tb = 9,
Ts = 10, ι(0) = b. We report in the figure for any time point t the optimal offer x∗(t) agent ι(t) can make; the
dashed lines are agents’ isoutility curves. The time point from which we can apply the backward induction method,
T = min{Tb, Ts}, is T = 9. At t = 9 agent ι(9) = s will accept any offer equal to or greater than 0, being RPs = 0. The
optimal offer x∗(8) of b at t = 8 is thus RPs = 0. The optimal offer x∗(7) of s at t = 7 is (x∗(8))←b = RPb − (RPb −
x∗(8))δb = 0.3. Analogously, the optimal offer x∗(6) of b at t = 6 is (x∗(7))←s = RPs + (x∗(7)−RPs)δs = 0.21. The
process continues to the initial time point t = 0.
The equilibrium strategies can be easily defined by specifying, according to x∗(t), the rules the agents employ to
choose their optimal action at each time point t :
σ ∗b (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < T
{
accept if σs(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
T  t  Tb
{
accept if σs(t − 1) RPb
exit otherwise
Tb < t exit
(1)
σ ∗s (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < T
{
accept if σb(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
T  t  Ts
{
accept if σb(t − 1) RPs
exit otherwise
Ts < t exit
(2)
The above strategies constitute the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of bargaining in presence of deadlines with
complete information (see [28]). The equilibrium outcome is (x∗(0),1). They can be computed in time linear in the
length of the bargaining.
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In this section we state (Section 3.1) the problem of bargaining with the alternating-offers protocol in presence
of one-sided uncertain deadlines, by enriching the complete information bargaining model presented in the previous
section and introducing appropriate solution concepts. We review (Section 3.2) the solutions currently available in
literature and we present (Section 3.3) the solution suggested in this paper.
3.1. Model enrichment and appropriate solution concept
We consider single-issue alternating-offers bargaining when one of the two agents does not exactly know her
opponent’s deadline. We will assume that the uncertain deadline is the buyer’s; the case wherein the uncertain deadline
is the seller’s can be treated analogously.
As is customary in game theory to avoid situations that cannot be faced, an incomplete information game is casted
into an imperfect information game with the introduction of probability distributions over the unknown parameters. In
our case we assume that b’s possible deadlines are distributed according to a probability distribution on R+ which is
common knowledge between the agents. We further assume that the support of the probability distribution is bounded;
and, since the agents can act only at time points t ∈ N, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the probability
distribution is finite on N. We denote by Tb = {Tb1, . . . , Tbn} the set of possible deadlines of b, by P 0b = {ω0b1, . . . ,ω0bn}
the pertinent probability distribution, and by BT 0b the couple BT
0
b = 〈Tb,P 0b 〉. Without loss of generality, we assume
that for any i ∈ [1, n− 1] it holds Tbi < Tbi+1 . We denote by bi the type of b whose deadline is t = Tbi . Agent b’s real
deadline is known only to b herself: it is her private information.
The solution concept employed in extensive-form games with complete information, namely, subgame perfect
equilibrium, is not satisfactory when information is imperfect. Specifically, it does not have the power to cut the so
called incredible threats [14], i.e., Nash equilibria that are non-reasonable given the sequential structure of the game.
The most common refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept in presence of information imperfectness
is the sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson [22]. We now review this concept.
Rational agents try to maximize their expected utilities relying on their beliefs about the opponent’s private infor-
mation [38] and such beliefs are updated during the game, depending on which actions have been actually made [22].
The set of beliefs held by each agent over the other’s private information after every possible sequence of actions in
the game is called a system of beliefs and is usually denoted by μ. These beliefs are probabilistic and their values at
time point t = 0 are given data of the problem. How beliefs evolve during the game is instead part of the solution
which should be found for the game. A solution of an incomplete information bargaining is therefore a suitable couple
a = 〈μ,σ 〉 called assessment.
An assessment a = 〈μ,σ 〉 must be such that the strategies in σ are mutual best responses given the probabilistic
beliefs in μ (rationality); and the beliefs in μ must reasonably depend on the actions prescribed by σ (consistency).
Different solution concepts differ on how they specify these two requirements.
For a sequential equilibrium a∗ = 〈μ∗, σ ∗〉, with σ ∗ = 〈σ ∗b , σ ∗s 〉, the rationality requirement is specified as sequen-
tial rationality. Informally, after every possible sequence of actions S, on or off the equilibrium path, the strategy σ ∗s
must maximize s’s expected utility given s’s beliefs prescribed by μ for S, and given that b will act according to σ ∗b
from there on and vice versa. The notion of consistency is defined as follows: assessment a is consistent in the sense of
Kreps and Wilson (or simply consistent) if there exists a sequence an of assessments, each with fully mixed strategies
and such that the beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule, that converges to a. By Kreps and Wilson’s theorem any
extensive-form game in incomplete information admits at least one sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies [22].
Moreover, as is customary in economic studies, e.g. Rubinstein’s [34], we consider only stationary systems of
beliefs, namely, if s believes a b’s type with zero probability at time point t , then she will continue to believe such a
type with zero probability at any time point t > t .
3.2. Solutions known in literature
The computation of a solution of an extensive-form game with imperfect information is known to be a hard task to
tackle. Contrary to what happens with complete information games, classic game theory does not provide any solving
technique to find sequential equilibria. From [19] there is long standing literature in computer science, e.g. [15,20,23],
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of the strategies. These algorithms have two main drawbacks that make them inapplicable in solving bargaining
situations: they work only with games with finite strategies and they produce equilibrium strategies but not systems
of beliefs. The lack of a solving algorithm for games as bargaining has pushed researchers to game theoretically study
each possible specific setting and develop relative algorithms. Well known examples of alternating-offers settings
studied in literature are: in [34] Rubinstein analyzes one-sided uncertainty over the discount factors with only two
types, in [5] Di Giunta and Gatti analyze in pure strategies one-sided uncertainty over deadlines, in [3] Chatterjee
and Samuelson analyze uncertainty over reservation prices where the agents can be of two possible types, and in [12]
Fatima et al. consider a slight variation of the alternating-offers protocol where there are multiple issues to negotiate
and analyze uncertainty over the weights of the issues.
The best known results for bargaining in the alternating-offers protocol with uncertain deadlines are due to Fatima
et al. in [9,10] and in [11]. In [9,10] they study the alternating-offers protocol with two-sided uncertainty over deadlines
and bounds on the agents’ rationality, more precisely, agents are self-constrained to play predefined tactics based on the
negotiation decision functions paradigm [8]. In [11] they consider a slight variation of the alternating-offers protocol
where there are multiple issues. The bargaining model they consider is exactly the one presented in Section 2.1,
except that the agents’ utility functions, offers, and acceptance are defined on a tuple of issues, instead of a single
issue. The solution of this model with complete information is analogous to the solution of the single issue model
presented in Section 2.2 and can be easily obtained by extending, as showed in [7], the offers’ backward propagation
we defined in Section 2.2. In presence of a single issue the solution of the multiple issue model and the one of the
single issue model collapse. Fatima et al. analyze the situation where the deadlines are uncertain and propose an
algorithm that finds equilibrium assessments in pure strategies for all the values of the parameters. Basically, their
algorithm searches in the space of the strategies exploiting the backward induction from the last possible deadline
to t = 0 with agents’ initial beliefs, and, once the optimal strategies at time point t = 0 have been found, the system
of beliefs is designed to be consistent with them. The computational complexity of their algorithm is linear in the
length of the bargaining and polynomial in the number of agents’ types. This work fails in finding equilibria for some
values of parameters. Indeed, as [5] shows, for a non-null measure subset of the space of the parameters there is
not any equilibrium assessment in pure strategies.3 The reason behind the failure of [11] in producing equilibrium
strategies for some settings of parameters is that in each step of backward induction they limit the search to the space
of the strategies, but they do not verify the existence of a consistent system of beliefs such that the found strategy is
sequentially rational. As a result, once their algorithm has produced the agents’ strategies at t = 0 and has designed
the system of beliefs consistent with them, the strategies could be not sequentially rational given the designed system
of beliefs. This happens for all the values of the parameters such that there is not any equilibrium in pure strategies [5].
We show an example where their algorithm fails in Section 4.1.3.
Analogously to the result presented in [5], it can be easily showed that for a non-null measure subset of the space
of the parameters there is not any equilibrium assessment in fully mixed strategies. Therefore, in the provision of
a satisfactory solution to the bargaining with uncertain deadlines, it is necessary to employ both pure and mixed
strategies.
3.3. Overview of our solution
In this paper we go beyond the state of art along two directions: our algorithm (i) finds a sequential equilibrium for
all the values of the parameters and (ii) requires less computational time than the algorithms presented in literature so
far. In particular, the computational time required by the proposed algorithm is asymptotically the same time required
to compute the solution with complete information, being linear in the length of the bargaining and asymptotically
independent of the number of types of the agent whose deadline is uncertain. Furthermore there is not any equilibrium
assessment that can be computed backward faster than ours. We present our result by degrees in Sections 4, 5, and 6
as follows.
We first analyze the alternating-offers protocol with uncertain deadlines in pure strategies (Section 4). We find an
assessment in pure strategies ap that is an equilibrium under some conditions on the parameters. We show that, except
3 In measure theory, a null set is a set that is negligible for the purposes of the measure in question [17]. As commonly done in literature to study
sets in Euclidean n-space Rn , we use Lebesgue measure.
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pure strategies. Moreover, we show that there is not any other equilibrium assessment in pure strategies that can be
computed backward faster than ap . We derive from ap a choice rule that applies to each time point the optimal actions
of the agents and we find the conditions on the parameters such that the choice rule can be employed to produce an
equilibrium. Then, we resort to mixed strategies in analyzing the alternating-offers protocol with uncertain deadlines
(Section 5). We find an assessment in mixed strategies am that is an equilibrium for all the values of the parameters
such that ap is not an equilibrium. More precisely, the conditions on the parameters such that am is an equilibrium
are complementary to the conditions that make ap an equilibrium. Therefore, there is always exactly one assessment,
either ap or am, that is an equilibrium. Moreover, no assessment in mixed strategies can be computed backward faster
than am. We derive from am a choice rule of the agents and the relative conditions on the parameters. Finally, we
provide (Section 6) our solving algorithm and we show how it can be extended in presence of multiple issues.
4. Equilibrium analysis in pure strategies
In this section we present (Section 4.1) a specific assessment in pure strategies that is an equilibrium for a non-null
measure subset of the space of the parameters;4 then we show (Section 4.2) that no equilibrium assessment in pure
strategies can be computed backward faster than ours and that, except for a null measure subset of the space of the
parameters, there is not any equilibrium in pure strategies when our assessment is not an equilibrium.
4.1. A pure strategy equilibrium assessment
Differently from what happens in presence of complete information, game theory does not provide any solving
technique to find equilibrium assessments when information is imperfect. Indeed, the backward induction method
cannot be employed because it does not consider the possible evolution of the beliefs. Here we exploit the idea behind
the backward induction method combining it with an a priori fixed system of beliefs. More precisely, the method we
will employ is the following:
(i) a priori fix a reasonable system of beliefs μ,
(ii) use backward induction to find the optimal strategies σ ∗ given μ,
(iii) identify possible anomalies in the use of backward induction, i.e. situations where the produced strategies σ ∗ are
not sequentially rational,
(iv) a posteriori prove the consistency of the assessment.
We now describe the application of our method.
4.1.1. Fixing the system of beliefs
We base our system of beliefs on the idea that b can signal her type on the equilibrium path only at her real deadline,
namely, a buyer bi can signal her type only at t = Tbi . Implicitly, this means that at any time point t all the types bis
whose deadline has not expired (i.e., Tbi  t) have the same equilibrium strategies but the type bi with Tbi = t (if she
exists). Although such an assumption seems very restrictive, we show in Section 4.2 that, if there is an equilibrium
assessment in pure strategies, then it respects such an assumption. In other words, bargaining in the alternating-offers
protocol with uncertain deadlines in pure strategies does not admit any equilibrium assessment where b can signal her
type at a time point t different from her real deadline.
We fix our system of beliefs such that, after any sequence of actions, s just excludes those deadlines Tbi s among
the initially possible ones that have already expired and normalizes the probabilities of the future ones. Notice that
among all the possible systems of beliefs that satisfy the property discussed above, ours is the simplest one: it employs
the same upgrading rule both on and off the equilibrium path.
We assume, for the sake of generality, that any time point t ∈ [0, Tbn] is a possible buyer’s deadline. We denote by
ω
t1
b (t2) the probability, calculated at t = t1 with μ, that b’s deadline is at t = t2, and by t1b (t2) =
∑+∞
t=t2 ω
t1
b (t) the
4 This result has been preliminarily presented in [5].
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according to the initial beliefs BT 0b . Our system of beliefs μ can be written as:
μ(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
for any τ such that τ < t ωtb(τ ) = 0
for any τ such that t  τ ωtb(τ ) =
ω0b(τ )
0b(t)
4.1.2. Backward induction with the fixed system of beliefs
Given the system of beliefs μ, we can find the optimal strategies using backward induction. However, in this
context the use of backward induction is more involved than in the complete information bargaining and requires
some explanations. More precisely, two issues are crucial: the determination of the time point T from which the
backward induction construction starts and the determination of the optimal offers along the construction.
We first focus on the determination of T . With complete information the backward induction construction can start
at the earliest of the two deadlines, while with our incomplete information framework, the earliest deadline is not a
priori known. Nevertheless, the backward induction construction can start from T = min{maxi{Tbi }, Ts}}, because it
is a priori known that after such a time point the agents will exit the negotiation; if the bargaining process reaches the
time point T , then agent ι(T ) would accept any non-negative utility offer; therefore, at time point t = T − 1 agent
ι(T − 1), if she make an offer, would offer ι(T )’s reservation price.
We now focus on the determination of the sequence of the optimal offers x∗(t)s from time point t = T − 1 to
time point t = 0. Although b’s types can be many, the sequence of the optimal offers x∗(t)s is the same for all the
b’s types. This is because μ prescribes that all b’s types whose deadline is beyond t have the same optimal action at
t and therefore, if they make an offer, they make the same offer; instead, b’s types whose deadline is at t or before
do not make any offer, but exit. Like in the complete information setting described in Section 2, it is possible to
backwardly infer the sequence of the offers x∗(t)s that the agents would do if they choose to make an offer. But there
are some complications in the construction of the sequence of offers x∗(t)s. In the complete information case the
offers composing this sequence have two properties:
(i) x∗(t) is the value propagated backward from time point t + 1,
(ii) x∗(t) is the value to be propagated backward at time point t − 1.
Essentially, this makes an offer x∗(t) to be the optimal offer s can make at time point t and, at the same time, the
optimal offer b can accept at time point t + 1. With imperfect information in bargaining, instead, not holding in
general properties (i) and (ii), the optimal offer of s at time point t could be different from the optimal offer that b
would accept at time point t + 1. In what follows we preliminarily introduce these topics informally and then we
report the exact formulas.
First, when ι(t) = s the optimal offer x∗(t) is not generally the value propagated backward from time point t + 1,
being x∗(t) generally different from (x∗(t + 1))←b. This is because different b’s types can have different maximum
acceptable offers at time point t + 1 (e.g., b1 accepts any offer  x1 and b2 accepts any offer  x2 with x1 < x2),
and the determination of what offer is to propagate backward depends on the beliefs of s. This happens at any time
point t where ι(t) = s and the time point t + 1 is a possible deadline of b. In this situation, b’s type whose deadline
is at time point t + 1, obtaining a non-positive utility from the continuation of the game, will accept any offer equal
to or lower than RPb, otherwise she will make exit. Instead, since all b’s types whose deadlines are beyond the time
point t + 1 gain a positive utility from the continuation of the game, they will accept any offer equal to or lower than
(x∗(t + 1))←b, otherwise they will offer x∗(t + 1). The value of (x∗(t + 1))←b, determined by backward induction
from T to t + 1, is obviously lower than RPb. Let EUs(σ, t) be the expected utility of s in making the strategy σ at
time point t . The expected utility EUs(σ, t) when σ = offer(x) is:
EUs(offer(x), t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
x > RPb tb(t + 2) · Us(x∗(t + 1), t + 2)
RPb  x > (x∗(t + 1))←b ωtb(t + 1) · Us(x, t + 1) + tb(t + 2) · Us(x∗(t + 1), t + 2)
(x∗(t + 1))←b  x Us(x, t + 1)
That is, any offer x > RPb will be rejected by all b’s types and the type whose deadline is at t + 1 will make exit,
whereas all the other types whose deadline has not expired will make the offer x∗(t + 1) that s will accept at t + 2;
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all the other types to make the offer x∗(t + 1) that s will accept at t + 2; any offer (x∗(t + 1))←b  x will be accepted
by all the types. We recall that ωtb(t +1) is the probability calculated at t with μ that b’s deadline is at t and tb(t +2)
is the probability calculated at t with μ that b’s deadline is beyond t + 1. In order to maximize EUs(σ, t), s chooses
her optimal action between offering (x∗(t + 1))←b and offering RPb. Notice that all the other possible offers that s
can make are dominated by making her best offer between (x∗(t + 1))←b and RPb.
Second, when ι(t) = s the optimal offer x∗(t) is not generally the value to be propagated backward, being x∗(t −1)
generally different from (x∗(t))←s. To determine the value to be propagated backward we need to introduce the notion
of equivalent value of an offer x at time point t : given an offer x made by s at time point t , the equivalent value of
x, denoted by e(x, t), is the value such that Us(e(x, t), t) = EUs(offer(x), t). Clearly, the equivalent value of an offer
that will be accepted with a probability equal to 1 is the offer itself. The right value to be propagated backward is the
equivalent value of x∗(t); we denote it by e∗(t). Easily, as optimal offers of agent ι(t) = s could be rejected, s could
accept at time point t an offer x such that EUs(accept, t) = Us(x, t) = EUs(offer(RPb), t). Summarily, if b makes
an offer at a time point t greater than or equal to (e∗(t + 1))←s, then s accepts it; if b makes an offer lower than
(e∗(t + 1))←s, then s rejects it and counteroffers x∗(t + 1).
Formulas to find the equivalent value e(x, t) and the sequence of the optimal offers x∗(t)s can be easily derived
from the formula of EUs(offer(x), t):
• when ι(t) = b, the optimal offer x∗(t) is x∗(t) = (e∗(t + 1))←s and, being such an offer surely accepted by s at
t + 1, the relative equivalent is the offer itself, i.e. e∗(t) = x∗(t);
• when ι(t) = s, the equivalent value of an offer x depends on s’s beliefs and it is:
e(x, t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x > RPb tb(t + 2) · ((x∗(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
RPb  x > (x∗(t + 1))←b ωtb(t + 1) · (x − RPs) + tb(t + 2) · ((x∗(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
(x∗(t + 1))←b  x tb(t + 1) · (x − RPs) + RPs
the optimal offer x∗(t) is the offer between RPb and (e∗(t + 1))←b that maximizes e(x, t), and consequently
e∗(t) = e(x∗(t), t). Notice that for s maximizing e(x, t) corresponds to maximizing EUs(offer(x), t).
With the system of beliefs μ the agents’ optimal action is unique at any time point t , except when the beliefs are
such that both offering RPb and offering (e∗(t + 1))←b maximize EUs(σ, t). In all these situations s can indifferently
offer one between RPb and (e∗(t + 1))←b. Being the equivalent value of offering RPb and (e∗(t + 1))←b equal, the
optimal offer of b at t − 1 is independent of what offer s would actually make at t .
Given x∗(t), the optimal action σ ∗
ι(t)
(t) of agent ι(t) at time point t is: exit, if the ι(t)’s deadline is at t and she has
received an offer that gives her negative utility; accept, if the ι(t)’s deadline is at t + 1 and she has received an offer
that gives her non-negative utility or if the ι(t)’s deadline is not at t + 1 and she has received an offer not worse for
her than (e∗(t))←ι(t); offer(x∗(t)), otherwise. The calculation of x∗(t) can be accomplished recursively on the basis
of e(x, t) as follows:
x∗(t − 1) =
⎧⎨
⎩
RPι(t) if t = T{
arg maxx∈{RPb,(e∗(t))←b}{e(x, t − 1)} if ι(t) = b
(e∗(t))←s if ι(t) = s if t < T
The time required to compute the sequences of offers x∗(t)s and equivalents e∗(t)s is linear in the length of the
bargaining and asymptotically independent of the number of the buyer’s types. With respect to the computation of the
solution with complete information it is needed at most a maximization between two possible values at any time point
where ι(t) = s. The equilibrium strategies can be defined specifying the agents’ choice rules on the basis of x∗(t)
and e∗(t) as extension of the ones with complete information reported in (1) and (2). More precisely, they are:
σ ∗bi (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < T
{
accept if σs(t − 1) (x∗(t))←b
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
T  t  Tbi
{
accept if σs(t − 1) RPb
exit otherwise
T < t exit
(3)bi
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each time point t the optimal offer x∗(t) that ι(t) can make and the relative e∗(t) are reported.
σ ∗s (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < T
{
accept if σb(t − 1) (e∗(t))←s
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
T  t  Ts
{
accept if σb(t − 1) RPs
exit otherwise
Ts < t exit
(4)
Differently from what happens with complete information, the equilibrium agreement can be reached beyond time
point t = 1. For example, when ι(0) = s, time point t = 1 is a possible b’s deadline but not the real one and s’s beliefs
are such that her optimal offer at time point t = 0 is x∗(0) = RPb.
Fig. 2 shows an example of backward induction construction with RPb = 1, RPs = 0, δb = 0.7, δs = 0.7, 〈Tb =
{5,8,9},P 0b = {0.5,0.3,0.2}〉, Ts = 10, ι(0) = b. In the figure we report, at any time point t , the optimal offer x∗(t)
agent ι(t) can make and the relative equivalent value e∗(t); the dashed line from t = 7 to t = 0 is the construction with
complete information; the dashed line that connects (7, (x∗(8))←b) to (6, (x∗(8))←2[b]) will be taken into account in
the next section. The time point from which we can apply the backward induction method, T = min{max{Tb}, Ts},
is T = 9. Since at time points t = 9 and t = 8 s believes b’s deadline to be t = 9, the construction in these time
points is exactly the one accomplished with complete information. That is, at t = 9 agent ι(9) = s will accept any
offer equal to or greater than 0, being RPs = 0. The optimal offer x∗(8) of b at t = 8 is thus RPs = 0. At t = 7 the
beliefs of s are ω7b(8) = 0.6 and ω7b(9) = 0.4. Being t = 8 a possible b’s deadline, at t = 7 agent ι(7) = s chooses
her optimal action between two alternatives: to offer (x∗(8))←b = 0.3 that b’s types with deadlines at t = 8 and t = 9
will accept or to offer RPb = 1 that will be accepted only by the type with deadline at t = 8 and rejected by the other
type to counteroffer RPs. The first alternative has an equivalent value e((x∗(8))←b,7) = (x∗(8))←b = 0.3, whereas
the second alternative has an equivalent value e(RPb,7) = ω7b(8) · (RPb − RPs)+ω7b(9) · (RPs − RPs)δs + RPs = 0.6.
The optimal offer x∗(7) of s at t = 7 is therefore RPb with e∗(7) = 0.6. The optimal offer x∗(6) of b at t = 6 is
(e∗(7))←s = 0.4. At t = 5 the beliefs of s are ω5b(5) = 0.5, ω5b(7) = 0.3, and ω5b(9) = 0.2. The optimal offer x∗(5)
of s at t = 5 is (x∗(6))←b = (e∗(7))←sb = 0.594 and the relative equivalent, being t = 5 a possible deadline of b, is
e∗(5) = 5b(6) · (x∗(5) − RPs) + RPs = 0.297. The optimal offer x∗(4) of b at t = 4 is (e∗(5))←s = 0.2079. From
t = 3 to t = 0 the backward induction construction continues as with complete information.
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sequential rationality is not respected because (e∗(7))←s > (x∗(8))←2[b]; the dashed lines are isoutility curves.
4.1.3. Anomalies in backward induction construction
The above backward induction construction provides the sequentially rational strategies relying on the system of
beliefs μ we have chosen, when they exist. However, they could not exist for some parameter settings. This can
happen because one agent (precisely, the buyer) might deviate from strategy σ ∗ to offer something unacceptable for
the opponent in order to be refused and to later be in a much stronger position and gain more. An example is depicted
in Fig. 3.
The bargaining situation considered in Fig. 3 is the same considered in Fig. 2, except for the values of the proba-
bilities: in this situation P 0b = {0.5,0.4,0.1} instead of P 0b = {0.5,0.3,0.2}. That is, s believes time point t = 8 to be
a possible b’s deadline with higher probability than in the previous situation. The construction from t = 9 to t = 7 is
exactly the same of the previous situation, except for the value of e∗(7). In this situation e∗(7) = 0.8. The backward
induction construction imposes that at t = 6 an offering buyer should offer (e∗(7))←s, but it can be easily seen that
such an offer is not the optimal offer of both b’s types with deadline at t = 8 and t = 9. The type with deadline at
t = 8 can actually maximize her utility offering (e∗(7))←s. The type with deadline at t = 9 can instead maximize her
utility offering something unacceptable (e.g., RPs), then receiving counteroffer RPb, and finally re-counteroffering
RPs at t = 8 (that s will accepted). Indeed, it can be observed in the figure that the equivalent value (x∗(8))←2[b]
of offering something unacceptable and reaching the agreement (RPs,9) is lower (and then preferable for the buyer)
than the equivalent value (e∗(7))←s of offering (e∗(7))←s and reaching the agreement ((e∗(7))←s,7). Instead, in the
bargaining situation depicted in Fig. 2 this anomaly is not present, since (e∗(7))←s < (x∗(8))←2[b].
This anomaly arises because different b’s types with Tbi > t might have different optimal offers at time point t ,
violating what is prescribed by μ. This happens at any time point t where ι(t) = b, the time point t + 2 is a possible
deadline of b, the optimal offer of s at time point t + 1 is RPb, and Ub(x∗(t), t) < Ub(x∗(t + 2), t + 2). In order for
the strategies (3) and (4) to be sequentially rational, no buyer’s type must prefer making at time point t something
else x∗(t) to reach the agreement (x∗(t + 2), t + 2). It trivially follows that the condition required for the sequential
rationality of the strategies is that the following inequality holds at any time point t ∈ [0, T − 2] where ι(t) = b:
(e∗(t + 1))←s  (x∗(t + 2))←2[b]. (5)
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backward induction the agents’ strategies keeping the initial beliefs and, once the strategies at time point t = 0 have
been produced, the system of beliefs is designed to be consistent with the produced strategies. We discuss the applica-
tion of this algorithm to a subgame of the bargaining situation depicted in Fig. 3, showing that the strategies it produces
are not sequentially rational given the system of beliefs. Exactly, we apply the algorithm to the subgame starting from
t = 6. The backward induction construction produced by [11] from t = 9 to t = 7 is the same construction above
produced by our method. That is, s makes at t = 7 the offer RPb, otherwise she would accept any offer equal to or
greater than (e∗(7))←s; b’s type with deadline at t = 8 will accept RPb, instead the type with deadline at t = 9 will
reject such an offer to make the offer RPs. The b’s optimal actions at t = 6 produced by the algorithm are: b’s type
with deadline at t = 8 makes (e∗(7))←s, whereas b’s type with deadline at t = 9 makes (x∗(8))←2[b]. The system of
beliefs consistent with them can be easily produced: if s observes the offer (e∗(7))←s, then she believes that b’s dead-
line is at t = 8; if s observes the offer (x∗(8))←2[b], then she believes that b’s deadline is at t = 9; we omit the system
of beliefs off the equilibrium path being unnecessary for our discussion. Given this system of beliefs we analyze the
sequential rationality of the produced strategies. Consider the optimal action of b’s type with deadline at t = 8: she
can improve her utility making the optimal action of b’s type with deadline at t = 9. If she offers (x∗(8))←2[b], then s
will believe that b’s deadline is at t = 9 and will accept such an offer. This is because the optimal offer s can make in
the subgame starting from t = 7 where b’s deadline is t = 9 is (x∗(8))←b and her utility of making this offer is lower
than her utility of accepting (x∗(8))←2[b]. Therefore, the strategies are not sequentially rational given the system of
beliefs.
4.1.4. Equilibrium assessment
Collecting the system of beliefs μ, the strategies σ ∗, and the sequential rationality condition presented in the
previous sections, we can now state the following theorem whose proof is reported in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 2. If for any time point t ∈ [0, T − 2] where ι(t) = b inequality (5) holds, then the assessment a = 〈μ,σ ∗〉
above described is a sequential equilibrium.
This assessment can be computed backward from t = T on as prescribed in Section 4.1.2 until either the time point
t = 0 is reached or the condition (5) is not satisfied. The computational time required to compute this assessment is
linear in the length of the bargaining and asymptotically independent of the number of b’s types.
4.2. Analysis of equilibrium computation and existence
In this section we show that there is not any equilibrium assessment which can be computed backward faster than
ours and that, when our assessment is not an equilibrium, there is not any equilibrium assessment in pure strategies,
except for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters.
At first we characterize all the possible equilibrium assessments in terms of equilibrium strategies independently of
the system of beliefs one can adopt. We show that, if a bargaining situation admits at least one equilibrium assessment
a in pure strategies, then (except for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters) the equilibrium strategies
must be such that at any time point t where ι(t) = b the following condition holds:{
for all i, j such that Tbi , Tbj > t it must be σ ∗bi (t) = σ ∗bj (t)
for all i, j such that Tbi = t, Tbj > t it must be σ ∗bi (t) = σ ∗bj (t)
(6)
Notice that our μ is a possible, but not the unique, system of beliefs consistent with (6). We base our proof on the
special case with only two types of buyer, which we call, for the sake of clarity, early buyer be and late buyer bl with
Tbe < T  Tbl . We show subsequently how the proof in the general case can be produced by iteratively applying the
special case.
By considering the agents’ optimal actions at any time point t < Tbe prescribed by a generic equilibrium assess-
ment, we state the following lemma whose proof is reported in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3. Given two buyer’s types, at any time point t < Tbe where ι(t) = b it must be that σ ∗be (t) = σ ∗bl (t) except for
a null measure subset of the space of the parameters.
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we state the following lemma whose proof is reported in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 4. Given two buyer’s types, at time point t = Tbe where ι(t) = b it must be that σ ∗be (Tbe ) = σ ∗bl (Tbe ).
By Lemmas 3 and 4 we can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Except for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters, if there is an equilibrium assessment
a = (μ∗, σ ∗), then the equilibrium strategies σ ∗ satisfy (6) at any time point t where ι(t) = b.
Proof sketch. The proof in the special case with two buyer’s types trivially follows from Lemmas 3 and 4. The proof
in the general case with a number n of types can be easily obtained by iteratively applying the special case. Consider
a set {b1,b2, . . . ,bn} of possible b’s types where, without loss of generality, Tbi < Tbi+1 holds for any i. Consider
the subgame starting from Tbn−2 where the possible types are bn−2, bn−1, and bn. Since bn−2 will make exit we
can exclude it from our analysis and we can apply the special case of theorem deriving that bn−1 and bn have the
same strategies at any t ∈ [Tbn−2 , Tbn−1). Therefore, we can aggregate bn−1 and bn in a unique ‘fictitious’ type before
t = Tbn−1 and apply the special case of theorem to the subgame starting from Tbn−3 where the possible types are bn−3,
bn−2, and the ‘fictitious’ type. The iteratively application of the special case of the theorem continues until the type
b1 has been considered. 
From Theorem 5 we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 6. There is not any equilibrium assessment in pure strategies that can be computed backward faster than
the assessment provided in Theorem 2.
Proof sketch. We firstly notice that no algorithm based on backward induction can have computational complexity
strictly lower than O(C · T ), where C is the computational cost of a single step of backward induction and is, in
general, a function of the number of b’s types. This is because the backward induction method requires to analyze
every possible time point where the agents act. Since the complexity of our algorithm depends linearly on T , we can
limit our analysis to C.
By Lemmas 3 and 4, at any time point t where ι(t) = b agent b can have two optimal actions, if time point t is a
possible deadline of b, and only one otherwise. Therefore, at any time point t where ι(t) = s and time point t + 1 is a
possible deadline of b, s can compute her optimal offer searching for the offer that maximizes her expected utility in
a set of at least two possible alternatives. That is, C  2. Our solution, searching in a set of two possible alternatives,
requires exactly the minimum computational time needed to compute a step of backward induction. In addition, our
system of beliefs is the only one, among all the ones consistent with (6), that employs the same upgrading rule both
on and off the equilibrium path. It follows that our assessment is the only one where the optimal strategies of the
agents are the same both on and off the equilibrium path. That is, our assessment is the unique that does not require
the computation of the equilibrium strategies off the equilibrium path, being these equal to the ones on the equilibrium
path. 
We show now that, if there is a time point t where ι(t) = b and inequality (5) does not hold, then there is not
any equilibrium assessment in pure strategies except for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters. In
Section 4.1.3 we showed that, if the agents reach a time point t where ι(t) = b and inequality (5) does not hold relying
on the initial beliefs (removed the types whose deadline has expired and normalized the residual probabilities), then
at such time point t our μ is not consistent with the optimal strategies. Here we strengthen such a statement showing
that, given any a = (μ,σ ), where μ is consistent with (6) and σ is sequentially rational given μ, if there is a time
point t such that ι(t) = b and inequality (5) does not hold, then μ cannot be consistent with σ . Considering the special
case with two buyer’s types be and bl , we state the following lemma whose proof is reported in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 7. With two buyer’s types, if at time point t = Tbe − 2 inequality (5) does not hold and ι(Tbe − 2) = b and the
agents can reach such a time relying on the initial beliefs P 0, then it must be that σ ∗ (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗ (Tbe − 2).b be bl
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Lemma 7. By considering Lemmas 3 and 7, we can state the following theorem whose proof is reported in Ap-
pendix A.5.
Theorem 8. Except for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters, if there exists a time point t where
ι(t) = b and inequality (5) does not hold, then there is not any equilibrium assessment in pure strategies.
Summarily, bargaining with uncertain deadlines can admit more sequential equilibria in pure strategies. Our as-
sessment has two properties: there is not any other equilibrium assessment that can be computed backward faster and
it is an equilibrium whenever there is an equilibrium assessment in pure strategies.
5. Equilibrium analysis in mixed strategies
In this section we present our assessment in mixed strategies. At first we analyze (Section 5.1) the situation where
the buyer’s types are two, and then we provide (Section 5.2) the solution in presence of a generic number of buyer’s
types.
5.1. Mixed strategy in presence of two types
We consider a bargaining situation with two buyer’s types, be and bl , and such that condition (5) does not
hold at time point t = Tbe − 2. For the sake of brevity we use ωt+1be in the place of ωt+1b (Tbe ), and analogously
ωt+1bl in the place of ω
t+1
b (Tbl ). Condition (5) can be expressed in terms of beliefs as follows: there is a threshold
ω
Tbe−2
be =
(x∗(Tbe ))←2[b]−(x∗(Tbe ))←2[s]
(RPb)←s−(x∗(Tbe ))←2[s] such that, if the agents reach time point t = Tbe − 2 with ω
Tbe−2
be  ω
Tbe−2
be , then
the equilibrium in the continuation game starting from t = Tbe −2 can be in pure strategies.5 As we showed in the pre-
vious section, since every equilibrium assessment in pure strategies allows the agents to reach time point t = Tbe − 2
with initial beliefs on the equilibrium path, then, if ω0be > ω
Tbe−2
be , no equilibrium assessment in pure strategies exists.
In order to overtake such a problem, we introduce an assessment in mixed strategies which does not allow the agents
to reach time point t = Tbe − 2 with ωTbe−2be > ω
Tbe−2
be on the equilibrium path. Specifically, in our assessment the
probability ωtbe monotonically decreases on the equilibrium path and is equal to ω
Tbe−2
be at time point t = Tbe − 2.
The principle we exploit to make ωbe decreasing on the equilibrium path is: the strategy of bl is pure and prescribes a
single action, whereas the strategy of be is mixed and prescribes the randomization between the optimal action of bl
and another action. The optimal action of bl is the unique action that allows the game to continue on the equilibrium
path. Therefore, once the optimal action of bl is observed, the probability ωbe is reduced according to the probability
whereby be makes the observed action. In order to be an equilibrium it is also necessary that s randomizes.
According to this principle, several equilibrium assessments in mixed strategies can be found when condition (5)
does not hold. We provide an assessment with the property that it is an equilibrium if and only if condition (5) does
not hold. We preliminarily introduce the construction of the assessment and we subsequently discuss the details.
We start backward from time point t = T (with two b’s types T = min{Tbl , Ts}). In the continuation game starting
from t = Tbe the equilibrium strategy must be pure. Easily, be’s dominant action is exit, whereas bl will never make
exit before t = T . Thus be and bl have strictly different optimal actions and then be will never make the optimal action
of bl . In the interval [Tbe , T ] we use the complete information construction presented in Section 2.2, where the unique
possible b’s type is bl . We denote such a construction by x∗bl (t). When condition (5) does not hold at t = Tbe − 2, the
backward induction construction discussed in Section 4.1.2 is altered introducing a mixed strategy from Tbe on, until
the mixed strategy leads to an equilibrium. We denote with [<t , >t ] the interval of time wherein the assessment is in
mixed strategies. It is such that >t = Tbe and <t is the first time point before >t where the assessment cannot be in mixed
strategies. The time point <t will be determined during the backward induction construction checking some conditions.
5 A continuation game is defined as a subgame, but its root node can be a non-singleton information set.
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If these conditions are satisfied before reaching t = 0, then <t > 0 and the construction follows from t = <t to t = 0 in
pure strategies as discussed in Section 2.2, otherwise <t = 0.
The construction in mixed strategies employed in [<t , >t ] is based on two sequences of offers: a “high” sequence
denoted by xˆ(t), and a “low” sequence denoted by xˇ(t) (see Fig. 4 for an example; the details of the construction will
be discussed later). Basically, at each time point t where they act, be and s mix between offering the values given by
the two sequences xˆ(t) and xˇ(t) with probabilities αt and βt , respectively, whereas bl acts a pure strategy offering
xˇ(t). The probabilities αt and βt will be computed such that the mixed strategy is sequentially rational. We present
our assessment in mixed strategies as follows:
(i) a priori fix two sequences xˆ(t) and xˇ(t) whereby agents’ optimal actions will be based and derive agents’
strategies σ ∗,
(ii) determine the probabilities αt and βt whereby agents will randomize over their optimal actions,
(iii) produce the system of beliefs to be Bayes consistent with the strategies σ ∗ on the equilibrium path,
(iv) a posteriori prove the sequential rationality of the strategies and the consistency of the system of beliefs off the
equilibrium path.
We discuss in what follows the application of our method.
5.1.1. Mixed strategies
We fix the two sequences of offers xˆ(t)s and xˇ(t)s as follows:
• xˆ(t) = x∗be (t), i.e., the optimal offer at time point t in the complete information game where b is of the type be,
calculated as prescribed in Section 2.2,
• xˇ(t) = (x∗(Tbe ))←(Tb −t)[b], i.e., the backward propagation of x∗(Tbe ) with respect to b’s utility.e
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• Tbe  t : the agents’ strategies are pure and equal to those provided in Section 4.1, i.e. bl and s base their optimal
actions on x∗(t) ≡ x∗bl (t);
• <t +2 t < Tbe and ωtbl = 0: the optimal actions at t = Tbe − 2 cannot be pure since inequality (5) does not hold.
Moreover, by construction, b cannot have pure optimal actions at any time point t ∈ [<t +2, Tbe ). The condition
required to have pure optimal actions at time point t when the construction from time point t + 1 on follows in
mixed strategies is a generalization of inequality (5). Specifically, such a condition requires that ι(t) = b and that
inequality
(e∗(t + 1)|P 0b )←s  (xˇ(t + 1))←b (7)
holds, where e∗(t + 1)|P 0b denotes the optimal equivalent of s at time point t + 1 calculated with initial beliefs
P 0b after removing the types whose deadline has expired and normalizing the residual probabilities. (In absence
of mixed strategies at t it holds e∗(t + 1)|P 0b = e∗(t + 1).) The agents employ mixed strategies as follows:
– bl employs a pure strategy based on xˇ(t): if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1), then she accepts, otherwise she offers xˇ(t);
– be employs a mixed strategy based on xˇ(t) and xˆ(t): if σs(t − 1)  xˇ(t − 1), then she accepts; if xˇ(t − 1) <
σs(t − 1)  xˆ(t − 1), then she accepts with probability 1 − αt and rejects to offer xˇ(t) with probability αt ;
otherwise she offers xˆ(t) with probability 1 − αt and offers xˇ(t) with probability αt ;
– s employs a mixed strategy based on xˇ(t) and xˆ(t): if σb(t − 1)  xˆ(t − 1), then she accepts; if xˆ(t − 1) >
σb(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1), then she accepts with probability βt (σs(t − 2)) and rejects to offer xˆ(t) with probability
1 − βt (σs(t − 2));6 otherwise she offers xˆ(t);
• <t +2 t < Tbe and ωtbl = 0: the optimal actions of s and of be are those in the corresponding complete informa-
tion game, whereas the optimal action of bl is the one she employs when
<
t +2 t  Tbe and ωtbl = 0;
• t = <t +1: s employs a pure strategy maximizing her equivalent value between offering xˇ(<t +1) and xˆ(<t +1);
• t  <t : being x∗(t) < xˇ(t), inequality (7) holds and then the optimal actions are pure and are those provided in
Section 2.2 where x∗(<t ) = (e∗(<t +1))←s.
By construction, time point t = <t is the first time point back from Tbe where inequality (7) holds and the equilibrium
can be in pure strategies. Obviously, when the backward construction reaches the initial time point without holding
inequality (7), part of the above strategy does not appear.
The equivalent value e(x, t) of s for any t such that <t < t < Tbe can be calculated as follows (we recall that
EUs(offer(x), t) = Us(e(x, t), t)):
e(x, t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
x > xˆ(t) ωtbe · (1 − αt+1) · (xˆ(t + 1))←s + (1 − ωtbe · (1 − αt+1)) · (xˇ(t + 1))←s
xˆ(t) x > xˇ(t) ωtbe · (1 − αt+1) · x + (1 − ωtbe · (1 − αt+1)) · (xˇ(t + 1))←s
xˇ(t) x x
Formally, the equilibrium strategies can be defined by specifying the agents’ choice rules on the basis of x∗(t),
xˆ(t), xˇ(t), αt , and βt as extension of the ones reported in (3) and (4) as follows:
σ ∗bl (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t  <t
{
accept if σs(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
<
t < t  Tbe
{
accept if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1)
offer(xˇ(t)) otherwise
Tbe < t < T
{
accept if σs(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
T  t  Tbl
{
accept if σs(t − 1) RPb
exit otherwise
Tbl < t exit
6 The dependency of βt on σs(t − 2) is needed to grant the existence of the equilibrium also when s acts at time point t − 2 off the equilibrium.
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t  <t
{
accept if σs(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
<
t < t < Tbe
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1){
accept 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt if xˇ(t − 1) < σs(t − 1) xˆ(t − 1){
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt otherwise
t = Tbe
{
accept if σs(t − 1) RPb
exit otherwise
Tbe < t exit
σ ∗s (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < <t
{
accept if σb(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
t = <t +1
{
accept if σb(
<
t ) x∗(<t )
offer(x)x = arg max
x∈{xˇ(<t +1),xˆ(<t +1)} e(x,
<
t +1) otherwise
<
t +3 t < Tbe
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
accept if σb(t − 1) xˆ(t − 1){
accept βt (σs(t − 2))
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − βt (σs(t − 2)) if xˆ(t − 1) > σb(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1)
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
Tbe < t < T
{
accept if σb(t − 1) x∗(t − 1)
offer(x∗(t)) otherwise
T  t  Ts
{
accept if σb(t − 1) RPs
exit otherwise
Ts < t exit
5.1.2. Mixing probabilities
The values of the probabilities αt and βt (σs(t − 2)) must be such that the following conditions hold:
• αt is such that s, once she has observed the offer xˇ(t), is indifferent between accepting such an offer and rejecting
it to offer xˆ(t + 1) at time point t + 1. Formally, Us(xˇ(t), t + 1) = EUs(offer(xˆ(t + 1)), t + 2) given that σb(t) =
offer(xˇ(t));
• βt (σs(t − 2)) is such that be, if σs(t − 2) ∈ (xˇ(t − 2), xˆ(t − 2)], is indifferent between accepting σs(t − 2) and
rejecting it to offer xˇ(t − 1) at time point t − 1, and, if σs(t − 2) /∈ (xˇ(t − 2), xˆ(t − 2)], is indifferent between
offering xˆ(t −1) and offering xˇ(t −1) at time point t −1. Formally, Ub(σs(t −2), t −1) = EUb(offer(xˇ(t −1)), t)
and Ub(xˆ(t − 1), t) = EUb(offer(xˇ(t − 1)), t), respectively.7
The formulas to compute the values of αt and βt (σs(t − 2)) are
αt = ω
∗,t+1
be · (1 − ω
∗,t
be )
ω
∗,t
be · (1 − ω
∗,t+1
be )
, βt (σs(t − 2)) =
⎧⎨
⎩
σs(t − 2) ∈ (xˇ(t − 2), xˆ(t − 2)] (xˆ(t))←2[b]−σs(t−2)(xˆ(t))←2[b]−xˇ(t−2)
σs(t − 2) /∈ (xˇ(t − 2), xˆ(t − 2)] (xˆ(t))←2[b]−xˆ(t−2)(xˆ(t))←2[b]−xˇ(t−2)
(8)
where
ω
∗,t
be =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t > Tbe 0
<
t +1 < t  Tbe
⎧⎨
⎩
ι(t) = b ω∗,t+1be
ι(t) = s (1−ω
∗,t+2
be )·xˇ(t−1)+ω
∗,t+2
be ·xˆ(t−1)−(xˇ(t+1))←2[s]
xˆ(t−1)−(xˇ(t+1))←2[s]
t  <t +1 ω0be
(9)
7 The expected utility EUb can be defined similarly to EUs .
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xˇ(t − 1).
It can be easily showed that the values of βt (σs(t − 2)) are always well defined, i.e. ∈ (0,1) in [<t +2, >t ]. This is
because at any time point t belonging to this interval xˆ(t) > xˇ(t). We now show that αt and ω∗,tbe have well defined
values of probability, i.e., αt ∈ (0,1) and ω∗,tbe ∈ [ω
Tbe−2
be ,ω
0
be ], only in the interval [
<
t +2, >t ].
By considering time point t = Tbe − 2 and formulas (8) and (9), we can state the following lemma whose proof is
reported in Appendix A.6.
Lemma 9. When at time point t = Tbe − 2 condition (5) does not hold, then αTbe−2 and ω∗,Tbe−1be have well defined
probability values and vice versa.
By considering any time point t such that <t +2 < t < Tbe , we can now state the following lemma whose proof is
reported in Appendix A.7.
Lemma 10. Consider a time point t such that the construction from time point t +2 to Tbe is based on the above mixed
strategies: when at such a time point t condition (7) does not hold, then αt and ω∗,t+1be have well defined probability
values and vice versa.
By the inductively applying Lemma 10 we have the following theorem whose proof is trivial and then omitted.
Theorem 11. When condition (5) does not hold at t = Tbe − 2, then exclusively in the interval [<t , >t ] the values of the
probabilities αt and ω∗,t+1be are well defined and vice versa.
This means that the values of the probabilities αt and ω∗,t+1be in our mixed strategy are well defined at any time point
t where agents cannot employ pure strategies. Therefore, the use of our mixed strategy is perfectly complementary to
the use of our pure strategy.
5.1.3. System of beliefs
Now we specify the system of beliefs μ. For any t such that t  <t +1 or Tbe  t μ is the system of beliefs employed
in Section 4.1.1. For any t such that <t +2 t  Tbe , on the equilibrium path, μ is the system of beliefs induced by the
Bayes’ rule according to the above equilibrium strategies, while off the equilibrium path it is such that s, once she has
observed σb(t −1) ∈ [xˇ(t −1), xˆ(t −1)), is indifferent between accepting it or rejecting it to offer xˆ(t). Specifically μ
is:
μ(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
σb(t − 1) > xˆ(t − 1) ωtbe = 1
xˆ(t − 1) σb(t − 1) > xˇ(t − 1) ωtbe = ω
∗,t
be +
(1−ω∗,tbe )·(σb(t−1)−xˇ(t−1))
(xˆ(t−1)−xˇ(t−1))
xˇ(t − 1) σb(t − 1) ωtbe = ω
∗,t
be
We can now illustrate the bargaining situation depicted in Fig. 4, where RPb = 1, RPs = 0, δb = 0.85, δs = 0.85,
〈Tb = {7,10},P 0b = {0.9,0.1}〉, Ts = 11, and ι(0) = s. Easily, the backward induction construction starts from time
point T = 10 where s acts. Since at any time point from t = 7 to t = 10 s believes b’s deadline to be t = 10, the
construction in these time points is the one with complete information where b’s deadline is t = 10. On the equilibrium
path be makes exit in this interval of time. The optimal offer x∗(9) of bl at t = 9 is RPs = 0, the optimal offer x∗(8)
of s at t = 8 is (x∗(9))←b = 0.15, and the optimal offer x∗(7) of bl at t = 7 is (x∗(8))←s  0.13.
Consider time point t = 6, the strategy of s cannot be pure. We build the pure strategy construction as prescribed
by Section 4.1 and we show that the condition that must be satisfied to have pure strategies, i.e. condition (5), does not
hold. According to the pure strategy construction presented in Section 4.1, since t = 7 is a possible b’s deadline, at
time point t = 6 s chooses the offer that maximizes her expected utility between RPb = 1 and (x∗(7))←b  0.26. Since
e(RPb,6)  0.91 and e((x∗(7))←b,6)  0.26, the optimal offer x∗(6) of s is RPb and the relative optimal equivalent
value e∗(6) is 0.91. In the figure, this value of e∗(6) is labeled with e∗(6)|P 0 (this is because in what follows web
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not hold, being (e∗(6)|P 0b )←s  0.78 > (x∗(7))←2[b]  0.37.
Therefore, we introduce a mixed strategy at time points t = 5 and t = 6 as prescribed by Section 5.1.1. The “high”
sequence of offers xˆ(t)s is: xˆ(6) = RPb = 1, and xˆ(5) = (xˆ(6))←s = 0.85. The “low” sequence of offers xˇ(t)s is:
xˇ(7) = x∗(7)  0.13, xˇ(6) = (xˇ(7))←b  0.37, and xˇ(5) = (xˇ(6))←b  0.46. The optimal actions at time point t = 5
are: be randomizes between offering xˆ(5) with probability 1 − α5 and offering xˇ(5) with probability α5, bl offers
xˇ(5); at time point t = 6 the optimal actions of s are to accept xˆ(5) and to randomize between accepting xˇ(5) with
probability β6 and rejecting it to offer xˆ(6) with probability 1−β6. The value of α5 is calculated imposing that, when
b offers xˇ(5), the expected utilities of s from accepting it and offering xˆ(6) are the same: EUs(accept,6) = Us(xˇ(5),6)
and EUs(offer(xˆ(6)),6) = ω∗,6be · Us(xˆ(6),7) + (1 − ω
∗,6
be ) · Us(xˇ(7),7) where ω
∗,6
be is the probability that b is of the
type be, once she has offered xˇ(5) and s has upgraded her beliefs according to μ. The value of α5 is  0.21. Similarly,
the value of β6 is calculated imposing that the expected utilities of be from offering xˆ(5) and xˇ(5) are equal. The
value of β6 is  0.24. Due to the presence of the mixed strategy, the optimal equivalent value e∗(6) is lower than
e∗(6)|P 0b and it is (e∗(6))←s = xˇ(5).
Given the optimal actions of the agents from t = 5 to t = 10, s chooses at time point t = 4 her optimal action
between offering xˆ(4) and xˇ(4). In the figure it can be observed that her optimal offer is xˆ(4) and the relative equivalent
value e∗(4)|P 0s is such that at time point t = 3 condition (7) does not hold. Thus, it is necessary to introduce a mixed
strategy also at time points t = 4 and t = 5. The process continues to the initial time point t = 0. Notice that at time
point t = 1 condition (7) holds and the construction follows from t = 2 to t = 0 in pure strategies.
5.1.4. Equilibrium assessment
Collecting the strategies, the mixing probabilities, and the system of beliefs presented in the previous sections, we
can state the following theorem whose proof is reported in Appendix A.8.
Theorem 12. The above assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if condition (5) does not hold at time point
t = Tbe − 2.
The calculation of the equilibrium can be accomplished step by step from the deadline of the bargaining back to the
initial time, determining, in addition to the sequences of the optimal offers x∗(t)s and of the optimal equivalent values
e∗(t)s computed in the solution with pure strategies, the sequences xˆ(t), xˇ(t), αt , ω∗,tbe , and β
t
. The computational
time required to find the equilibrium depends linearly on the length of the bargaining and requires only a maximization
between two possible offers at the time point t = Tbe − 1 (exactly as the equilibrium in pure strategies). Analogously
to what showed in Section 4.2, it can be showed that there is not any equilibrium assessment in mixed strategies that
can be computed backward faster than ours.
5.2. Mixed strategy in presence of more than two types
We show here how the mixed strategy presented in the previous section can be generalized to the case where the
buyer’s types are more than two. We omit in this section the formulas to compute the equilibrium, because they are long
and unnecessary for the comprehension of the result; we report them in Appendix B. The presence of many types raises
several complications in the calculation of the equilibrium strategies. Nevertheless, the principle whereby the mixed
strategy is based still holds: there are two sequences of offers, a “high” sequence xˆ(t) and a “low” sequence xˇ(t),
and the agents base their strategies (pure or mixed) on these. The equilibrium strategies can be calculated backward
from time point t = T to the initial time point t = 0 employing pure strategies and inserting, when needed, mixed
strategies. Therefore, the equilibrium path will be composed of intervals of time points where the agents have a single
optimal actions and of intervals of time points where the agents randomize over two optimal actions (see, e.g., Fig. 6).
We consider the most general case where all the time points before T are possible deadlines of b and there exists a
time point >t such that ι(>t ) = b and condition (5) does not hold at t = >t −2. We need to build the equilibrium in mixed
strategies from >t back to <t where <t is such that ι(<t ) = b and the equilibrium strategy can be pure. Exactly as with two
types, the construction can be produced backward checking at each time point t where ι(t) = b whether condition (7)
is satisfied or not. In the affirmative case, the construction can be in pure strategies, otherwise, the construction must
be in mixed strategies.
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any time point t at most three different optimal actions. This means that the buyer’s types can be grouped in three
distinct sets and we can limit our analysis to them without searching for the optimal actions of each single buyer’s
type. This leads to an efficient computation of the equilibrium: at any time point t no more than three different optimal
actions must be computed. Denoting by θb(t) the b’s type whose deadline is at t , at any time point t the buyer’s types
can be grouped as follows:
• ˆb(t): all the types belonging to ˆb(t) have pure strategies accepting any offer lower than or equal to (xˆ(t))←b
and otherwise offering xˆ(t); let be ˆb(
>
t −1) = ∅ the initialization set of ˆb, and ˆt1b (t2) =
∑
θb(t)∈ˆb(t2) ω
t1
b (t)
the cumulative probability of ˆb(t2) at time point t1;
• ˜b(t): all the types belonging to ˜b(t) have mixed strategies accepting any offer lower than or equal to (xˆ(t))←b
with probability 1 −αt and rejecting it to offer xˇ(t) with probability αt ; let be ˜b(>t −1) = ∅ the initialization set
of ˜b, and ˜t1b (t2) =
∑
θb(t)∈˜b(t2) ω
t1
b (t) the cumulative probability of ˜b(t2) at time point t1;
• ˇb(t): all the types belonging to ˇb(t) have pure strategies accepting any offer lower than or equal to xˇ(t −
1) and otherwise offering xˇ(t); let be ˇb(
>
t −1) = {θb(t): t  >t } the initialization set of ˇb, and ˇt1b (t2) =∑
θb(t)∈ˇb(t2) ω
t1
b (t) the cumulative probability of ˇb(t2) at time point t1.
Analogously to the situation with two types, s has mixed equilibrium strategies based on xˆ(t) and xˇ(t) with a
βt (σs(t − 2)).
The construction can be done backward from >t on as follows. The “low” sequence of offers xˇ(t)s is easily de-
terminable, being xˇ(t) = (x∗(>t ))←(>t −t)[b]. The “high” sequence of offers xˆ(t)s is harder to find and depends on the
probability values of the s’s beliefs. When ι(t) = s the value of xˆ(t) is the optimal offer that s would make at such time
point relying on the initial beliefs after removing the types whose deadline has expired and normalizing the residual
probabilities. Precisely, at any time point t such that ι(t) = s, s maximizes her expected utility given her beliefs. If
t = >t −1 the equivalent value of s is:
e(x, t) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x > RPb ˇtb(t + 1) · ((xˇ(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
RPb  x > xˇ(t) ωtb(t + 1) · (x − RPs) + ˇtb(t + 1) · ((xˇ(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
xˇ(t) x tb(t + 1) · (x − RPs) + RPs
whereas, if t < >t −1, the equivalent value of s is:
e(x, t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x > RPb (ˆtb(t + 1) + (1 − αt+1) · ˜tb(t + 1)) · ((xˆ(t + 1))←s − RPs)
+ (αt+1 · ˜tb(t + 1) + ˇtb(t + 1)) · ((xˇ(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
RPb  x > (xˆ(t + 1))←b ωtb(t + 1) · (x − RPs) + (ˆtb(t + 1) + (1 − αt+1) · ˜tb(t + 1))
× ((xˆ(t + 1))←s − RPs) + (αt+1 · ˜tb(t + 1) + ˇtb(t + 1))× ((xˇ(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
(xˆ(t + 1))←b  x > xˇ(t) (1 − ˇtb(t + 1) − αt+1 · ˜tb(t + 1)) · (x − RPs) + (ˇtb(t + 1)
+ αt+1 · ˜tb(t + 1)) · ((xˇ(t + 1))←s − RPs) + RPs
xˇ(t) x tb(t + 1) · (x − RPs) + RPs
At time point t = >t −1 the value that maximizes the equivalent value e(x, t) is RPb. At each time point t < >t −1 only
three possible offers can maximize e(x, t): RPb, (xˆ(t +1))←b, or xˇ(t). The value x that maximizes e(x, t) is the value
to be assigned to xˆ(t).
The determination of xˆ(t) when ι(t) = b is more complicated than when ι(t) = s. Indeed, in presence of more than
two b’s types, the choice rules that each b’s type employs to choose her optimal actions can be of four different forms.
Each choice rule has mutually exclusive conditions, i.e., when a specific choice rule can be employed to produce an
equilibrium the other three cannot, and vice versa. When the condition of a specific choice rule is satisfied, it holds
that the strategies it prescribes are sequentially rational given the system of beliefs, the mixing probabilities are well
defined, and the system of beliefs is consistent with the strategies (the proof is omitted, being similar to the proof of
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at least one choice rule can be employed. Each choice rule is characterized by:
• a specific composition of the sets ˆb(t), ˜b(t), and ˇb(t),
• a specific strategy 〈σ ∗
ˆb(t)
(t), σ ∗
˜b(t)
(t), σ ∗
ˇb(t)
(t), σ ∗s (t + 1)〉 with specific formulas to compute xˆ(t) and αt ,
• a specific system of beliefs μ(t).
In what follows we just overview the four choice rules and their construction; we report in Appendix B the formulas
to compute them. Given the construction from time point T to time point t +1, it is possible to find the choice rule that
can be employed at a time point t when ι(t) = b to produce the equilibrium. The principal condition that characterizes
the four choice rules is the value of xˆ(t + 1) computed in the construction from time point T to time point t + 1.
We call choice rule 1 the choice rule that can be employed when xˆ(t + 1) = (xˆ(t + 2))←b. If xˆ(t + 1) = RPb three
possible choice rules can be employed, we call them choice rules 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. The conditions that discriminate
their employment are mathematically complicated, and then omitted here. Once the conditions have been checked
and the choice rule to employ has been found, it is necessary to compose the sets ˆb(t), ˜b(t), and ˇb(t), and to
calculate xˆ(t), αt , and βt+1.
Summarily, once the optimal action of s has been found at time point t given the construction from time point T to
t + 1, the choice rule to employ at time point t − 1 can be found by checking some conditions. The equilibrium can
be found in time linear in the length of the bargaining and asymptotically independent of the number of buyer’s types.
6. Solving algorithm and extension to the multiple issue setting
In this section we initially present (Section 6.1) our solving algorithm and then we show (Section 6.2) how our
algorithm can be extend to address the situation where the issues to negotiate are more than one.
6.1. Solving algorithm
We collect the results presented in Sections 4 and 5 and we provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium
assessment. Specifically, in the two previous sections we have provided the equilibrium assessment in function of
some parameters, here we provide an algorithm to compute such parameters. The inputs of the algorithm are δb, δs,
〈Tb,ω0b(t)〉, Ts, RPb, RPs, and ι(t). The output of the algorithm is the set of the parameters needed to specify the
equilibrium assessment: x∗(t), e∗(t), xˆ(t), xˇ(t), αt , βt , ˜∗,t+1b (t), ˆb(t), ˜b(t), and ˇb(t).
The algorithm is simple (see Algorithm 1) and works iteratively from time point t = T to time point t = 0. At each
iteration t the algorithm adds a time point backward to the current partial solution according to the agent that acts at
1: T ← min{Ts,maxi {Tbi }}
2: initialize variables, i.e., x∗, e∗, ˆb, ˜b, ˇb, at time point T − 1
3: for (t = T − 2, t  0, t = t − 1) do
4: if ι(t) = s
5: compute x∗(t) as the value that maximizes e(x, t) relying on the initial beliefs P 0b , after removing the types whose deadline has expired
and normalizing the residual probabilities, as prescribed in Section 5.2
6: else
7: if condition (7) holds then
8: compute x∗(t) as prescribed in Section 4.1
9: else
10: determine the choice rule in mixed strategies whose conditions are satisfied, compose the sets ˆb, ˜b, ˇb, and compute xˆ(t), xˇ(t),
αt , βt+1 as prescribed in Section 5.2 and Appendix B
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: return [x∗(t), e∗(t), xˆ(t), xˇ(t), αt , βt , ˆb(t), ˜b(t), ˇb(t), ˜∗,t+1b (t)]
Algorithm 1. EQUILIBRIUM_FINDER (δb, δs, 〈Tb,ω0b(t)〉, Ts,RPb,RPs, ι(t)).
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initial beliefs, after removing the types whose deadline has expired and normalizing the residual probabilities, among
RPb, (xˆ(t + 1))←b, and (xˇ(t + 1))←b, as prescribed in Section 5.2. At each time point where ι(t) = b, we need to
check condition (7): if it holds then b’s strategy is pure, otherwise it is mixed. If it is pure, then the optimal offer
at time point t can be simply computed in closed form, otherwise a mixed strategy is introduced at time point t and
consequently at time point t + 1. In this latter case it is necessary to determine what choice rule to employ checking
the conditions reported in Appendix B. Subsequently, the sets ˆb, ˜b, and ˇb are composed and the values of xˆ(t),
xˇ(t), αt , and βt+1 are computed as prescribed in Appendix B.
The algorithm has a computational complexity that is linear in T and asymptotically independent of the number
of buyer’s types. In the worst case it requires to check three conditions at any time point: when ι(t) = s, three values
can maximize e(x, t), whereas, when ι(t) = b, at most three conditions must be checked to determine the choice to
be employed.
We show two examples of backward induction construction produced with our algorithm, reporting also, for any
time point wherein the strategies are mixed, the form of the employed choice rule, the composition of the sets ˆb,
˜b, and ˇb, and the values of probabilities of αt and βt . In Fig. 5 we report an example of construction where
the probability distribution is uniform in [1,maxi{Tbi }]. In Fig. 6 we report an example of construction where the
probability distribution is based on two Gaussian-like distributions with means at t = 7 and t = 18.
We discuss some details of the bargaining situation depicted in Fig. 5. The time point from which we apply the
algorithm is T = min{max{Tb}, Ts} = 20. At t = 20 s acts and she accepts any offer equal to or greater than RPs = 0,
otherwise she makes exit. At t = 19, the optimal offer x∗(19) of θb(20) is RPs = 0, instead θb(19) does not make any
offer, but makes exit.
Consider time point t = 18. The beliefs of s, obtained from P 0b after removing the types whose deadline has expired
and normalizing the residual probabilities, are ω18b (t) = 0.3 for any t ∈ [18,20]. Being t = 19 a possible deadline of b,
at t = 18 s chooses the offer between RPb and (x∗(19))←b that maximizes her expected utility. The equivalent value
e(RPb,18) is e(RPb,18) = ω18b (19) · (RPb − RPs)+18b (20) · (RPs − RPs)+ RPs = 0.5, instead the equivalent value
e((x∗(19))←b,18) is e((x∗(19))←b,18) = 18b (19) · ((x∗(19))←b −RPs)+RPs = 0.016. Therefore, the optimal offer
x∗(18) of s is RPb = 1 with e∗(18) = 0.016. The value of e∗(18) is labeled in figure with e∗(18)|P 0b (this is because
in what follows we introduce a mixed strategy and then the value of e∗(18) will be modified).
Consider time point t = 17. Condition (7) does not hold, being (e∗(18))←s > (x∗(19))←2[b]. We need therefore
to introduce a mixed strategy at t = 17 and t = 18. Checking the conditions reported in Appendix B, we see that the
choice rule to be employed is the choice rule 1. It prescribes that at t = 17 the types θb(18) and θb(19) randomize
between offering xˇ(18) and xˆ(18) with α17 = 0.09 and 1 − α17, respectively, whereas the type θb(20) offers xˇ(17).
The value of xˇ(17) can be easily calculated being (x∗(19))←2[b] = 0.049; the value of xˆ(18), calculated as prescribed
by Appendix B, is ( ω
0
b(19)
ω0b(17)+ω0b(18)
(RPb − RPs)+ RPs)δs = 0.5. The introduction of a mixed strategy at t = 17 induces
a mixed strategy also for s at t = 18. Exactly, at t = 18, if s receives xˆ(17), she accepts it and, if she receives the
offer xˇ(17), she randomizes between accepting it and rejecting it to offer RPs.
Consider time point t = 16. The beliefs of s, obtained from P 0b after removing the types whose deadline has
expired and normalizing the residual probabilities, are ω16b (t) = 0.2 for any t ∈ [16,20]. At t = 16 s chooses the offer
among RPb, (xˆ(17))←b  0.5, and (xˇ(17))←b  0.073 that maximizes her expected utility. The equivalent values
calculated as prescribed in Section 5.2 are: e(RPb,16)  0.394, e((xˆ(17))←b,16)  0.392, and e((xˇ(17))←b,16) 
0.058. Therefore, the optimal action of s is to offer RPb with e∗(16) = 0.394. The value e∗(16) is labeled in figure
with e∗(16)|P 0b (this is because in what follows we introduce a mixed strategy and then the value of e∗(16) will be
modified).
At t = 15, exactly as it happens at time point t = 17, condition (7) does not hold. Therefore a mixed strategy must
be introduced at time points t = 15 and t = 16. In this case the choice rule to employ is the choice rule 2.3. The
construction continues up to the initial time point as illustrated in figure.
6.2. Extension to the multiple issue setting
Multiple issue bargaining captures situations where agents can find agreements over the values of several parame-
ters. A common example is the negotiation between a buyer and a seller over several attributes of a good, such as
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point t .Fig. 6. Backward induction construction with RPb = 1, RPs = 0, δb = 0.96, δs = 0.96, 〈Tb = [0,20],P 0b = {0,0,0,0,0,0.02,0.11,0.24,0.11
Ts = 28, ι(0) = s; we report also the sets ˆb(t), ˜b(t), and ˇb(t) and the choice rule in mixed strategies whose conditions are satisfied at time
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can be easily extended to capture this situation: the utility functions, the offers, and the acceptance of the agents are
defined on tuples of values, one for each issue (see [7] for more details). For each issue the agents have a specific
reservation value and a specific discount factor. However, each agent has usually a single deadline for all the issues,
being the deadline relative to the good to negotiate and not to the single issues that characterize the good [6,12] (a
model where agents have different deadlines over different issues is discussed in [7]). Multiple issue bargaining can
be implemented according to different procedures, e.g. the issues can be negotiated sequentially or concurrently. In
what follows we consider the in-bundle procedure, where the issues are negotiated concurrently. This is because, as
showed in [11], the in-bundle procedure is the unique procedure that allows one to produce efficient agreements.
We denote by m the number of issues to negotiate. In presence of complete information the solution of the multiple
issue situation [7] is similar to the solution of the single issue situation described in Section 2.2, but two differences
there are. First, the optimal offers x∗(t)s are tuples of values that specify a value for each single issue. Second, with
a single issue the offers to accept can be easily expressed specifying a threshold on the value of the received offer,
e.g. s accepts at t any offer y such that y  (x∗(t))←s, with multiple issues instead the threshold is on the utility
of the received offer, e.g. s accepts at t any offer y such that Us(y, t)  Us(x∗(t), t). The sequence of the optimal
offers x∗(t)s can be found by backward induction by extending the backward propagation of an offer we defined in
Definition 1. Essentially, the backward induction construction is the same: at each time point t the optimal offer x∗(t)
of agent ι(t) is the offer such that agent ι(t + 1) is indifferent at t + 1 between accepting it and making her optimal
offer x∗(t + 1). Formally, Uι(t+1)(x∗(t), t + 1) = Uι(t+1)(x∗(t + 1), t + 2). The difference between the multiple issue
situation and the single issue situation lays on how x∗(t) can be computed given x∗(t + 1). With a single issue, the
backward propagation y = x←i is a function that maps an offer x ∈R at t to an offer y ∈ R at t − 1 (keeping constant
the utility of agent i) and the calculation of y can be easily accomplished in closed form. With multiple issues, the
backward propagation y = x←i maps an offer x ∈ Rm at t to an offer y ∈ Rm at t − 1 (keeping constant the utility
of agent i) and the calculation of y requires the solution of a convex programming problem [6]. In the most common
situations where the utility functions are linear, this problem can be solved in time linear in the number of issues, being
a fractional knapsack problem (a proof is provided in [11]). Summarily, the redefinition of the backward propagation
of an offer in presence of multiple issues allows one to treat the settings with single issue and with multiple issue in
the same way.
The extension of our work in presence of multiple issues can be achieved exactly as in the case with complete
information. Specifically, for each time point of the bargaining the algorithm produces the sequences x∗(t), e∗(t),
xˆ(t), and xˇ(t) solving for each single element of the sequences a fractional knapsack problem. Therefore, the compu-
tational complexity of the algorithm is linear in the length of the bargaining, linear in the number of the issues, and
asymptotically independent of the number of types of the agent whose deadline is uncertain, i.e. O(m · T ).
7. Conclusions and future works
The game theoretical study of bargaining situations is a prominent issue in computer science, since it allows one
to prescribe the behavior of rational agents. Nevertheless literature lacks of solutions when information is incomplete
and the actions available to the agents are infinite. On the one hand, game theory provides an appropriate solution
concept for extensive-form games with incomplete information, but no solving technique to find it. On the other hand,
algorithms available in computer science literature work only with finite games and do not produce systems of beliefs.
This pushes researchers to analyze each setting independently and to develop ad hoc specific algorithms.
In this paper we have focused on the alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertainty on the deadlines,
and we have game theoretically studied it to provide a solution. We have found a couple of agents’ choice rules that
apply an action and a probability distribution over the actions, respectively, and we showed that it is always possible
to produce an equilibrium where the actions at any single time point are those prescribed either by the pure strategy
choice rule or by the mixed strategy choice rule. We have showed in addition that our solution is such that there is not
any other solution that can be computed backward faster. The solving algorithm we provided is simple, being instead
complicated the game theoretical analysis that led to the development of the algorithm. Furthermore, the solving
algorithm is efficient, being its computational complexity asymptotically independent of the number of types of the
player whose deadline is uncertain. Exactly, its computational complexity is O(m ·T ) where m is the number of issues
and T is the deadline of the bargaining.
1146 N. Gatti et al. / Artificial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1119–1157Our work paves the way to a novel approach for employing game theoretical tools in the study of sequential games
with incomplete information. Schematically, the approach we have followed is organized in the following steps:
analysis of the game in the attempt to purge the set of the choice rules to employ to produce an equilibrium, finding
the conditions such that a choice rule can be employed, studying the existence of the equilibrium for all the values of
the parameters, and, finally, building the solution employing at each time point the choice rule whose conditions are
satisfied.
Our intention is to complete our work along two main directions. The first one concerns the extension of our
results in bargaining situations where other parameters are uncertain (i.e., δi,RPi ) and where the uncertainty over
the deadlines is two-sided. The second one concerns the automatization of the procedure we have followed in our
game theoretical analysis in order to develop efficient algorithms to solve extensive-form games with incomplete
information.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the main theoretical results
We report in this section the proofs of the main results provided in the paper.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 2
The sequential rationality can be easily proved by mathematical induction. Consistency can be proved by the
assessment sequence an = 〈μn,σn〉 where:
• σn is the fully mixed strategy profile such that before the real deadline of an agent there is probability 1 − 1n of
performing the action prescribed by σ ∗ and the remaining probability 1
n
is uniformly distributed among the other
allowed actions; while at the deadline or after it there is probability 1 − 1
n2
of performing the action prescribed by
σ ∗ and the remaining probability 1
n2
is uniformly distributed among the other allowed actions.
• μn is the system of beliefs obtained applying Bayes’ rule starting from the same a priori probability distribution
P 0b as in μ.
Each assessment an is “Bayes consistent” by construction. The convergence of σn to σ ∗ is trivial. As to μn, given
any arbitrary legal sequence S of actions (such that the bargaining does not conclude at the end of S and such that s
is the agent acting after S), call PSn = 〈ωSn,b1,ωSn,b2 , . . . ,ωSn,bm〉 the probabilities that s assigns to b’s deadlines after
sequence S according to μn. Sequence S might contain actions that could be interpreted as being in accordance to
the strategies σ ∗ (i.e. actions that are the actions prescribed by strategies σ ∗ for some deadline Tbi ); let τ the time of
the latest of such actions in S (if there are no such actions, set τ = −1 by convention). Let t = |S|. Some calculation
shows that, if t  T , then
ωSn,bi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if Tbi  τ
1
n
t−Tbi
·ω0bi∑
Tbht
ω0bh
+∑τ<Tbht 1nt−Tbh ·ω0bh
if τ < Tbi  t
ω0bi∑
Tbh>t
ω0bh
+∑τ<Tbh<t 1nt−Tbh ·ω0bh
if t < Tbi
Therefore
lim
n→+∞ω
S
n,bi =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if Tbi  t
ω0bi∑
T t ω
0
b
if t < Tbi
bh h
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A.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Let a∗ = (μ∗, σ ∗) an equilibrium assessment in pure strategies. By contradiction, let σ ∗be (t) = σ ∗bl (t). Therefore
by Bayes’ rule the beliefs of s at time point t + 1 are: if action σ ∗be (t) is observed, then 〈ωt+1be = 1,ωt+1bl = 0〉 (for
the sake of brevity we use ωt+1be in the place of ω
t+1
b (Tbe ), and analogously ω
t+1
bl ); if action σ ∗bl (t) is observed, then
〈ωt+1be = 0,ωt+1bl = 1〉.
We consider at first the case where t  Tbe − 2. If at time point t b acts on the equilibrium path, then at time point
t + 1 the optimal strategy of s is:
• if σ ∗be (t) is observed, then accept any offer greater than or equal to x∗be (t) (i.e., the optimal offer at time point t in
the complete information game where be is the type of b) and otherwise offer x∗be (t + 1) that on the equilibrium
path will be accepted by b at time point t + 2;
• if σ ∗bl (t) is observed, then accept any offer greater than or equal to x∗bl (t) (i.e., the optimal offer at time point t in
the complete information game where bl is the type of b) and otherwise offer x∗bl (t + 1) that on the equilibrium
path will be accepted by b at time point t + 2.
We notice that for a generic time point t where ι(t) = b the two possible equilibrium agreements will be reached no
later than the time point t + 2. Then, since we are considering the case where t  Tbe − 2, the agreements are reached
no later than Tbe . We notice also that be and bl have, for any t  Tbe , the same utility function. Then, in order to be an
equilibrium, σ ∗be (t) and σ
∗
bl (t) must be such that the two corresponding equilibrium agreements give the same utility
to be and bl , otherwise one type at least deviates. We consider all the possible cases.
• If σ ∗be (t) and σ ∗bl (t) are offers that s will accept at time point t + 1, then, since the outcomes are different by
hypothesis, they will give different utilities. As a result, one type at least will deviate from her action to make the
action of the other type.
• If σ ∗be (t) and σ ∗bl (t) are offers that will not be accepted at time point t + 1, then s will make different offers
at time point t + 1 according to the observed b’s offer and such offers will be accepted at time point t + 2,
giving thus different utilities. Precisely, being x∗be (t + 1) > x∗bl (t + 1), it follows that Ub(x∗be (t + 1), t + 1) <
Ub(x∗bl (t + 1), t + 1). As a result, be will deviate from her strategy σ ∗be (t) to make σ ∗bl (t).• If σ ∗bl (t) is an offer that will be accepted at time point t + 1 by s, whereas σ ∗be (t) is an offer that will not be
accepted at time point t + 1 by s to offer x∗be (t + 1), then, by hypothesis, it should be σ ∗bl (t) = (x∗be (t + 1))←b,
but bl can maximize her utility offering (x∗be (t + 1))←s = x∗be (t) given that s will accept it. As a result, bl will
deviate from her strategy σ ∗bl (t) to make σ
∗
be (t).• If σ ∗be (t) is an offer that will be accepted at time point t + 1 by s, whereas σ ∗bl (t) is an offer that will not be
accepted at the time point t + 1 by s to offer x∗bl (t + 1), then, by hypothesis, it should be σ ∗be (t) = (x∗bl (t + 1))←b,
but if (x∗bl (t + 1))←b < x∗be (t) or (x∗bl (t + 1))←b > x∗be (t), be can maximize her utility offering x∗be (t) that will
be accepted.8 As a result, be will deviate from her strategy σ ∗be (t), except for a null measure subset of the space
of the parameters, exactly when x∗be (t) ≡ (x∗bl (t + 1))←b, to make σ ∗bl (t). (For the sake of clarity, we report in
Fig. A.1 an example of construction wherein be and bl have different equilibrium strategies at time point t = 0.)
Thus, it follows by contradiction that σ ∗be (t) = σ ∗bl (t), except for a null measure subset of the space of the parame-
ters.
We consider now the case where t = Tbe − 1. If at time point t b acts on the equilibrium path, then at the time point
t = Tbe the optimal strategy of s is:
8 Notice that if (x∗bl (t + 1))←b < x
∗
be (t), then (x
∗
bl
(t + 1))←b will be rejected by s to offer x∗be (t + 1). And x∗be (t) is better for be with respect
to x∗b (t + 1).e
1148 N. Gatti et al. / Artificial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1119–1157Fig. A.1. Equilibrium with RPb = 1, RPs = 0, δb  0.8222, δs = 0.8, 〈Tb = {8,9},P 0b = {0.8,0.2}〉, Ts = 10, ι(0) = b where at time point t = 0
the two types have different pure equilibrium strategies; the equilibrium existence is granted by the singularity (RPs)←3[bs]2[b] ≡ (RPb)←3[sb]s .
• if σ ∗be (Tbe − 1) is observed, then accept any offer greater than or equal to RPs and otherwise exit (on the equilib-
rium path be will not accept anything beyond Tbe );
• if σ ∗bl (t) is observed, then accept any offer greater than or equal to x∗bl (Tbe − 1) and otherwise offer x∗bl (Tbe ) that
on the equilibrium path will be accepted at time point Tbe + 1.
The proof is analogous to the case where t  Tbe − 2. Notice that be and bl have the same utility function at time
point t = Tbe . We consider all the possible cases.
• If both σ ∗be (Tbe − 1) and σ ∗bl (Tbe − 1) are offers that would be accepted by s at t = Tbe , then one between be and
bl would deviate from her strategy to make the strategy of the other type.
• If σ ∗be (Tbe −1) and σ ∗bl (Tbe −1) are offers that will not be accepted at time point t +1, then both be and bl deviate
from their strategies to offer x∗bl (Tbe − 1) that will be accepted by s.• If σ ∗be (Tbe −1) is an offer that will be accepted at time point Tbe by s, whereas σ ∗bl (Tbe −1) is an offer that will not
be accepted at time point Tbe by s to offer x∗bl (Tbe ), then, by hypothesis, it should be σ
∗
bl (Tbe − 1) < x∗bl (Tbe − 1),
but, independently of the conjectures off the equilibrium path, the offer x∗bl (Tbe − 1) will be accepted by s. Thus,
both be and bl would offer x∗bl (Tbe − 1).• If σ ∗bl (Tbe −1) is an offer that will be accepted at time point Tbe by s, whereas σ ∗be (Tbe −1) is an offer that will not
be accepted at time point Tbe by s to offer x∗bl (Tbe ), then, by hypothesis, it should be x
∗
bl (Tbe −1) σ ∗bl (Tbe −1)
(x∗bl (Tbe ))←b. Since type be will gain utility equal to 0 (being σ ∗be (Tbe − 1) unacceptable, s will exit), type be can
gain more offering σ ∗bl (Tbe − 1).
Thus, it follows by contradiction that σ ∗be (t) = σ ∗bl (t). 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 4
Let a∗ = (μ∗, σ ∗) be an equilibrium assessment in pure strategies. By contradiction, let σ ∗be (Tbe ) = σ ∗bl (Tbe ).
Independently of the system of beliefs, the strategy σ ∗ (Tbe ) is to accept anything lower than RPb, otherwise exit.be
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lower than RPb. Thus, by contradiction σ ∗be (Tbe ) = σ ∗bl (Tbe ). 
A.4. Proof of Lemma 7
Let a∗ = (μ∗, σ ∗) an equilibrium assessment in pure strategies. We consider at first the case where T = Tbe + 1.
Let (e∗(Tbe − 1))←s > (x∗(Tbe ))←2[b] (i.e., inequality (5) is violated at t = Tbe − 2). Assume that the agents have
reached the time point Tbe − 2 relying on the initial beliefs. In this situation the equilibrium strategies at time points
t = Tbe and t = Tbl do not depend on the system of beliefs, being:
σ ∗be (Tbe ) =
{
accept if σs(Tbe − 1) RPb
exit otherwise
σ ∗bl (Tbe ) =
{
accept if σs(Tbe − 1) (RPs)←b
offer(RPs) otherwise
σ ∗s (T ) =
{
accept if σb(Tbe ) RPs
exit otherwise
whereas at time points t = Tbe − 2 and t = Tbe − 1 the equilibrium strategies depend on the system of beliefs
of s. At t = Tbe − 1 the beliefs of s on the equilibrium path depend on the equilibrium actions of b’s types at
t = Tbe − 2. By contradiction, let σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2). By Bayes’ rule (implied by Kreps and Wilson’s
consistency) the beliefs of s at time point t = Tbe − 1, once observed σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2), are the initial
ones. Therefore, if at time point t = Tbe − 2 b acts on the equilibrium path, then at time point t = Tbe − 1 the opti-
mal strategy of s is to accept any offer greater than or equal to (e∗(Tbe − 1))←s and otherwise offer RPb. It must be
σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) ∈ [(e∗(Tbe − 1))←s, (RPb)←s], otherwise be would deviate from offering σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) independently
of μ∗.9 Analogously it must be σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2)  (RPs)←2[b], otherwise bl would deviate from σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2) indepen-
dently of μ∗.10 Since, by hypothesis, (e∗(Tbe − 1))←s > (RPs)←2[b], if σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2), then at least one
type between be and bl deviates. Therefore, it follows by contradiction that σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2).
All the cases where T > Tbe + 1 and (e∗(Tbe − 1))←s > (x∗(Tbe ))←2[b] (i.e., violation of inequality (5) at t =
Tbe − 2) can be analyzed similarly, because, independently of μ∗, s will accept at time point Tbe + 1 any offer x
such that x  x∗bl (Tbe ) (i.e., the equilibrium offer at time point Tbe when s believes b to be of type bl). It must be
σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) ∈ [(e∗(Tbe − 1))←s, (RPb)←s], otherwise be would deviate from offering σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) independently of
μ∗. Analogously it must be σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2) (x∗bl (Tbe ))←2[b], otherwise bl would deviate from σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2) indepen-
dently of μ∗. By construction, x∗(Tbe ) ≡ x∗bl (Tbe ), then it follows that σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗bl (Tbe − 2). 
A.5. Proof of Theorem 8
We start considering the special case with two buyer’s types. By Lemma 3 it is almost always possible to reach
time point t = Tbe − 2 relying on the initial beliefs (if b makes the equilibrium offers, which are the same for both
types, and s refuses them, it can be seen that Kreps and Wilson’s consistency forces μ∗ to be such that the beliefs
remain the initial ones). In this situation, if inequality (5) does not hold at t = Tbe − 2, then from Lemma 7 it follows
σ ∗be (Tbe − 2) = σ ∗be (Tbl − 2), that contradicts Lemma 3. Therefore, if inequality (5) does not hold at t = Tbe − 2, then
the equilibrium assessment a∗ does not exist, except for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters.
The proof in the general case where the number of types of b is n can be easily obtained by iteratively applying
the special case where the types are two as suggested in the sketch of the proof of Theorem 5. 
9 We consider σ∗be (Tbe −2) < (e∗(Tbe −1))←s: if be makes such an offer, s would reject it to offer RPb at t = Tbe −1 that will be accepted by be
at time point t = Tbe ; however, if be makes (RPb)←s, such an offer would be accepted by s independently of her beliefs, giving to be more utility
than offering σ∗be (Tbe − 2), i.e., σ∗be (Tbe − 2) < (e∗(Tbe − 1))←s cannot be an equilibrium offer for be . We consider σ∗be (Tbe − 2) > (RPb)←s:
if be makes such an offer, s would accept it; however, if be makes (RPb)←s , such an offer would be accepted by s at time point t = Tbe − 1
independently of her beliefs, giving to be more utility than offering σ∗be (Tbe − 2), i.e., σ∗be (Tbe − 2) > (RPb)←s cannot be an equilibrium offer
for be .
10 Whatever the system of beliefs of s is, s would accept (RPb)←s at time point t = Tbl , that is equivalent for bl to the offer (RPs)←2[b] accepted
at time point t = Tbe − 1. Thus offering σ∗bl (Tbe − 2) > (RPs)←2[b] is dominated for bl by making any offer unacceptable by s at t = Tbe − 1,
and then, at time point t = Tbe offer RPs that will be accepted, i.e., σ∗b (Tbe − 2) (RPs)←2[b] .l
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At time point t = Tbe − 1, being ω∗,Tbebe = 0, we have ω
∗,Tbe−1
be =
xˇ(Tbe−2)−(xˇ(Tbe ))←2[s]
xˆ(Tbe−2)−(xˇ(Tbe ))←2[s] = ω
Tbe−2
be . Being for any
t xˆ(t) > xˇ(t) and xˇ(t) > (xˇ(t + 2))←2[s], it follows that 1 > ω∗,Tbe−1be > 0. If inequality (5) does not hold, then
ω
Tbe−2
be > ω
∗,Tbe−1
be and, vice versa, if ω
Tbe−2
be > ω
∗,Tbe−1
be , then inequality (5) does not hold. If ω
Tbe−2
be > ω
∗,Tbe−1
be ,
then 1 > αTbe−2 > 0 and, vice versa, if 1 > αTbe−2 > 0, then ωTbe−2be > ω
∗,Tbe−1
be . Thus the probability values of
ω
∗,Tbe−1
be and α
Tbe−2 are well defined if and only if inequality (5) does not hold. 
A.7. Proof of Lemma 10
The proof is by mathematical induction. The base of the induction is given by Lemma 9, exactly it is 1 > ω∗,Tbe−1be =
ω
Tbe−1
be if and only if condition (5) does not hold. The inductive step can be proved as follows. The probability ω
∗,t
be
can be written as:
ω
∗,t
be = ω
∗,t+2
be ·
a
a + b +
b
a + b
where a = xˆ(t −1)− xˇ(t −1) and b = xˇ(t −1)− (xˇ(t +1))←2[s]. The values a and b are such that a, b ∈ (0,1) for all
t ∈ [<t , >t ]. Thus for any time t ∈ [<t , >t ] where ι(t) = b, if 1 > ω∗,t+2be > 0, then 1 > ω
∗,t
be > ω
∗,t+2
be > 0. If inequality (7)
does not hold at time point t , then it is ωtbe > ω
∗,t+2
be and, vice versa, if ω
t
be > ω
∗,t+2
be , then inequality (7) does not
hold at time point t . If ωtbe > ω
∗,t+2
be , then it is 1 > α
t > 0 and, vice versa, if 1 > αt > 0, then ωtbe > ω
∗,t+2
be . Thus the
probability values of ω∗,t+2be and α
t are well defined if and only if inequality (7) does not hold. 
A.8. Proof of Theorem 12
We at first provide the proof of sequential rationality of the strategies given the system of beliefs.
At any time point t  Tbe the proof of sequential rationality of the strategies is trivial, since in these time points the
game is with complete information. At any time point t < Tbe the proof is by mathematical induction, where the base
of the induction is given by the analysis of time points t = Tbe − 1 and t = Tbe − 2.
Consider time point t = Tbe −1. If s receives any offer equal to or greater than xˆ(Tbe −2), she believes her opponent
to be of type be and her optimal action is to accept. Therefore she cannot gain more by deviating from σ ∗. If s receives
any offer belonging to the interval [xˇ(Tbe − 2), xˆ(Tbe − 2)), the system of beliefs is such that it is indifferent for s
to accept such an offer or reject it to offer xˆ(Tbe − 1) and no action is better than these. Therefore she cannot gain
more by deviating from σ ∗. Being by construction xˆ(Tbe − 1) > xˇ(Tbe − 1), it holds βTbe−1 ∈ (0,1) and then s can
actually randomize. If s receives any offer lower than xˆ(Tbe − 2), the system of beliefs is such that the expected utility
of offering xˆ(Tbe − 1) is greater than the utility of accepting the received offer and no action is better than making
such an offer. Therefore s cannot gain more by deviating from σ ∗.
Consider time point t = Tbe − 2. Consider be. If be receives any offer greater than xˆ(Tbe − 3), her optimal action is
to reject it and the value of βTbe−1 is such that offering xˆ(Tbe −2) and offering xˇ(Tbe −2) give the same expected utility
to be. Therefore be does not deviate from σ ∗. If be receives any offer belonging to the interval (xˇ(Tbe −3), xˆ(Tbe −3)],
the value of βTbe−1 is such that accepting the received offer and rejecting it to offer xˇ(Tbe − 2) give the same expected
utility to be and no action is better than these. Therefore be does not deviate from σ ∗. Not holding by construction
condition (5), it holds αTbe−2 ∈ (0,1) and then be can actually randomize. If be receives any offer equal to or lower
than xˆ(Tbe −3), her optimal action is to accept the received offer. Therefore be cannot gain more by deviating from σ ∗.
Consider bl . If bl receives any offer greater than xˇ(Tbe − 3), her optimal action is to reject it and offer xˇ(Tbe − 2).
Therefore bl does not deviate from σ ∗. If bl receives any offer equal to or lower than xˆ(Tbe − 3), her optimal action
is to accept the received offer. Therefore bl cannot gain more by deviating from σ ∗.
The two steps above can be inductively applied until αt or βt have not well defined values of probability. When
condition (7) holds, αt and βt have not well defined values of probabilities and the construction can continue in pure
strategies as prescribed in Section 4.1.
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t  Tbe , the fully mixed strategy to employ is the one used in [5], i.e. for any t < Tbi bi puts 1 − 1n on the equilibrium
strategy and 1
n
distributed over all the other strategies and for t  Tbi bi puts 1 − 1n2 on the equilibrium strategy
and 1
n2
distributed over all the other strategies. For all ts such that <t < t < >t s puts βt (σs(t − 2)) · (1 − 1n ) and
(1 − βt (σs − 2)) · (1 − 1n ) on the equilibrium strategies and 1n distributed over all the other strategies. The fully mixed
strategy of b is more complicated (for the sake of simplicity, we report non-normalized probabilities):
• be: she puts αt · (1− 1n ) and (1−αt ) · (1− 1n ) on the equilibrium strategies, 1n distributed over all the offers > xˆ(t),
αt · 1
n
distributed over all the offers < xˇ(t), and Cbe · 1n distributed over all the offers belonging to (xˇ(t), xˆ(t));
• bl : she puts (1 − 1n − 1
n
2Tbl
) on the equilibrium strategy, 1
n
2Tbl
distributed over all the offers > xˆ(t), 1
n
distributed
over all the offers < xˇ(t), and Cbl · 1n distributed over all the offers belonging to (xˇ(t), xˆ(t)).
The coefficients Cbe and Cbl are computed such that the consistency holds also in the interval (xˇ(t), xˆ(t)). 
Appendix B. Formulas to compute mixed strategy with many types
Four choice rules can be employed at time point t when ι(t) = b and the equilibrium assessment cannot be in
pure strategies. However, given a setting, only one choice rule can be employed at a single time point t to produce
an equilibrium, whereas different choice rules can be employed within a construction at different time points. The
principal condition that discriminates the use of the choice rules is the value of xˆ(t + 1) computed in the backward
construction from time point T to time point t + 1. When xˆ(t + 1) = (xˆ(t + 2))←b, only one choice rule can be
employed. We call it choice rule 1, and we describe it in Appendix B.1. When xˆ(t + 1) = RPb, it is necessary to
check other conditions, being three the possible choice rules that can be employed. We call them choice rules 2.1, 2.2,
and 2.3, and we discuss them in Appendix B.2.
B.1. Choice rule 1
It can be employed at time point t when σ ∗s (t + 1) = (xˆ(t + 2))←b. In this situation it can be easily seen that it
is always possible to increase the value of αt to have Us(xˇ(t), t + 1) = EUs(offer(xˆ(t + 1)), t + 1) preserving that
s prefers at time point t + 1 offering (xˆ(t + 2))←b to offering RPb. The rule to use in order to compose the sets
ˆb(t), ˜b(t), ˇb(t) is:⎧⎨
⎩
ˆb(t) = {θb(t + 1)}
˜b(t) = ˆb(t + 2) ∪ ˜b(t + 2) ∪ {θb(t + 2)}
ˇb(t) = ˇb(t + 2)
The parameters whereby the equilibrium strategy and the system of beliefs are based can be computed as follows:
xˆ(t) = ˜
0
b(t)
ˆ0b(t) + ˜0b(t)
· [(xˆ(t + 1))←s − RPs] + RPs
˜
∗,t+1
b (t) =
xˇ(t) · (1 − ˜∗,t+3b (t + 2)) + ˜∗,t+3b (t + 2) · (xˆ(t + 1))←s − (xˇ(t + 2))←2[s]
(xˆ(t + 1))←s − (xˇ(t + 2))←2[s]
αt = ˜
∗,t+1
b (t) · ˇ0b(t)
(1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · ˜0b(t)
αt+2 = ˜
∗,t+3
b (t + 2) · (1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · (ω0b(t + 2) + ˆ0b(t + 2) + ˜0b(t + 2))
(1 − ˜∗,t+3b (t + 2)) · ˜∗,t+1b (t) · ˜0b(t + 2)
βt+1 = RPb − xˆ(t)RPb − xˇ(t)
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employed by the agents:
σ ∗
ˆb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) (xˆ(t))←b
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
σ ∗
˜b(t)
(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1){
accept 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt if xˇ(t − 1) < σs(t − 1) (xˆ(t))←b{
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt otherwise
σ ∗
ˇb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) (xˇ(t))←b
offer(xˇ(t)) otherwise
σ ∗s (t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
accept if σb(t) (xˇ(t + 1))←s or σb(t) = xˆ(t){
accept βt
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − βt if (xˆ(t + 1))←s > σb(t) > xˆ(t) or xˆ(t) > σb(t) > xˇ(t)
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
The system of beliefs is:
μ(t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
σb(t) (xˆ(t + 1))←s
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ˆt+1b (t + 1) = 0
˜t+1b (t + 1) = 1
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 0
(xˆ(t + 1))←s > σb(t) > xˆ(t)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ˆt+1b (t + 1) = 0
˜t+1b (t + 1) = ˜∗,t+1b (t) + (1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · σb(t)−xˇ(t)xˆ(t)−xˇ(t)
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 1 − ˜t+1b (t + 1)
σb(t) = xˆ(t)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ˆt+1b (t + 1) = (1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · ˜tb(t) · (1 +
ˆ0b(t)
˜0b(t)
)
− ˜∗,t+1b (t) · ˇtb(t)
˜t+1b (t + 1) = 1 − ˆt+1b (t + 1)
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 0
xˆ(t) > σb(t) > xˇ(t)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ˆt+1b (t + 1) = 0
˜t+1b (t + 1) = ˜∗,t+1b (t) + (1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · σb(t)−xˇ(t)xˆ(t)−xˇ(t)
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 1 − ˜t+1b (t + 1)
xˇ(t) σb(t + 1)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ˆt+1b (t + 1) = 0
˜t+1b (t + 1) = ˜∗,t+1b (t)
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)
B.2. Choice rule 2
It requires that σ ∗s (t + 1) = RPb and there are three possible forms of choice rules. In this situation it is not always
possible to increase the value of αt to have Us(xˇ(t), t + 1) = EUs(offer(xˆ(t + 1)), t + 1) preserving that s prefers
at time point t + 1 offering RPb to offering (xˆ(t + 2))←b. For high values of αt s could prefer at time point t + 1
offering (xˆ(t + 2))←b to offering RPb. In order to introduce the conditions of the choice rules, we need to compute
the following values:
A =
(
ˆ0b(t + 2)
0b(t + 3)
+ ˜
0
b(t + 2)
0b(t + 3)
· (1 − αt+2)
)
· ((xˆ(t + 2))←s − RPs)
+
(
αt+2 · ˜
0
b(t + 2)
0(t + 3) +
ˇ0b(t + 2)
0(t + 3)
)
· ((xˇ(t + 2))←s − RPs) + RPsb b
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(
ˆ0b(t + 2)
0b(t + 3)
+ ˜
0
b(t + 2)
0b(t + 3)
· (1 − αt+2)
)
· ((xˆ(t + 2))←b − RPs)
+
(
αt+2 · ˜
0
b(t + 2)
0b(t + 3)
+ ˇ
0
b(t + 2)
0b(t + 3)
)
· ((xˇ(t + 2))←s − RPs) + RPs
D =
(
ω0b(t + 2)
˜0b(t)
· (RPb − RPs) + RPs
)
· δs
C =
xˇ(t)
δs
− A
ω0b(t+2)
˜0b(t)
− A
∗ = B − A
(
ω0b(t+2)
˜0b(t)
− A) − (ω0b(t+2)
˜0b(t)
· ((xˆ(t + 2))←b − RPs) − B)
B.2.1. Choice rule 2.1
It can be employed when C ∗. In this situation the value of αt is such that s keeps to prefer at time point t + 1
offering RPb to offering (xˆ(t + 2))←b. The rule to use in order to compose the sets ˆb(t), ˜b(t), ˇb(t) is:⎧⎨
⎩
ˆb(t) = ∅
˜b(t) = {θb(t + 1), θb(t + 2)}
ˇb(t) = ˆb(t + 2) ∪ ˜b(t + 2) ∪ ˇb(t + 2)
(B.1)
The parameters whereby the equilibrium strategy and the system of beliefs are based can be computed as follows:
xˆ(t) = D
˜
∗,t+1
b (t) = C
αt = ˜
∗,t+1
b (t) · ˇ0b(t)
(1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · ˜0b(t)
αt+2 = ˜
∗,t+3
b (t + 2) · ˇ0b(t + 2)
(1 − ˜∗,t+3b (t + 2)) · ˜0b(t + 2)
βt+1 = RPb − xˆ(t)
RPb − xˇ(t)
The optimal actions of b at time point t and of s at time point t + 1 are:
σ ∗
˜b(t)
(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1){
accept 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt if xˇ(t − 1) < σs(t − 1) (xˆ(t))←b{
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt otherwise
σ ∗
ˇb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) (xˇ(t))←b
offer(xˇ(t)) otherwise
σ ∗s (t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
accept if σb(t) xˆ(t){
accept βt
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − βt if xˆ(t) > σb(t) > xˇ(t)offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
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μ(t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
σb(t) xˆ(t)
{
˜t+1b (t + 1) = 1
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 0
xˆ(t) > σb(t) > xˇ(t)
{
˜t+1b (t + 1) = ˜∗,t+1b (t) + (1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · σb(t)−xˇ(t)xˆ(t)−xˇ(t)
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 1 − ˜t+1b (t + 1)
xˇ(t) σb(t + 1)
{
˜t+1b (t + 1) = ˜∗,t+1b (t)
ˇt+1b (t + 1) = 1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)
B.2.2. Choice rule 2.2
It can be employed when C < ∗ and D  (xˆ(t + 2))←2[b]. In this situation the value of αt would be such that s
prefers at time point t + 1 offering (xˆ(t + 2))←b to offering RPb, thus a slight variation of the choice rule 2.1 is
needed. Choice rule 2.2 and choice rule 2.3 are complementary when C < ∗. The rule to use in order to compose
the sets ˆb(t), ˜b(t), ˇb(t) is:⎧⎨
⎩
ˆb(t) = {θb(t + 1)}
˜b(t) = {θb(t + 2)}
ˇb(t) = ˆb(t + 2) ∪ ˜b(t + 2) ∪ ˇb(t + 2)
(B.2)
The parameters whereby the optimal actions and the system of beliefs are based can be computed as follows:
xˆ(t) = D
˜
∗,t+1
b (t) = C
αt = ˜
∗,t+1
b (t) · ˇ0b(t)
(1 − ˜∗,t+1b (t)) · ˜0b(t)
αt+2 = ˜
∗,t+3
b (t + 2) · ˇ0b(t + 2)
(1 − ˜∗,t+3b (t + 2)) · ˜0b(t + 2)
βt+1 = RPb − xˆ(t)
RPb − (xˆ(t + 2))←2[b]
The optimal actions of b at time point t and of s at time point t + 1 are:
σ ∗
ˆb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) xˆ(t − 1)
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
σ ∗
˜b(t)
(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1){
accept 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt if xˇ(t − 1) < σs(t − 1) (xˆ(t))←b{
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − αt
offer(xˇ(t)) αt otherwise
σ ∗
ˇb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) (xˇ(t))←b
offer(xˇ(t)) otherwise
σ ∗s (t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
accept if σb(t) xˆ(t){
offer((xˆ(t + 2))←b) βt
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − βt if xˆ(t) > σb(t) > xˇ(t)
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
The system of beliefs is exactly the same of that for choice rule 1.
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It can be employed when C < ∗ and D < (xˆ(t + 2))←2[b]. The rule to use in order to compose the sets
ˆb(t), ˜b(t), ˇb(t) is:⎧⎨
⎩
ˆb(t) = {θb(t + 1)}
˜b(t) = ˆb(t + 2) ∪ ˜b(t + 2) ∪ {θb(t + 2)}
ˇb(t) = ˇb(t + 2)
This assessment form presents two anomalies with respect to the others. The first one is that the types that random-
ize, i.e, ˜b(t), do it with different probabilities. Specifically, all the types belonging to the set ˆb(t + 2) ∪ ˜b(t + 2)
randomize with probability αt1, whereas the type θb(t + 2) randomizes with probability αt2. The second one is that
this choice rule modifies the construction from time point T to time point t + 1. Specifically, it modifies the values of
xˆ(t + 1). In order to compute the parameters whereby the equilibrium strategies are based, we need to compute the
following values:
E = ˜
∗,t+3
b (t + 2)
1 − ˜∗,t+3b (t + 2)
F = RPb − (xˆ(t + 2))←b − E · ((xˆ(t + 2))←b − (xˆ(t + 2))←s)
G = (xˆ(t + 2))←b − (xˆ(t + 2))←s
H = (1 + E) · G←s
The parameters whereby the optimal actions and the system of beliefs are based can be computed as follows:
xˆ(t) = ˜
0
b(t)
ˆ0b(t) + ˜0b(t)
· [(xˆ(t + 2))←bs − RPs] + RPs
xˆ(t + 1) = (xˆ(t + 2))←b
˜
∗,t+1
b,1 (t) =
xˇ(t) + (xˆ(t))←s · E − (1 + E) · (xˇ(t + 2))←2[s] + E · GF · H
(1 + (1 + E) · G
F
) · H
˜
∗,t+1
b,2 (t) = ˜∗,t+1b (t) · (1 + E) ·
G
F
− E · G
F
αt1 =
˜
∗,t+1
b,2 (t) · ˇ0b(t) · (1 + E)
(1 − ˜∗,t+1b,2 (t)) · ˜0b(t + 2) − ˜∗,t+1b,2 (t) · ˜0b(t + 2) · E
αt2 =
˜
∗,t+1
b,2 (t) · ˇ0b(t) · (1 + E)
(1 − ˜∗,t+1b,2 (t)) · ω0b(t + 2) − ˜∗,t+1b,2 (t) · ω0b(t + 2) · E
αt = α
t
2 · ω0b(t + 2) + αt1 · ˜0b(t + 2)
˜0b(t)
αt+2 = E · (ˆ0b(t + 2) + ˜0b(t + 2)) ·
1 − ˜∗,t+1b,1 (t) − ˜∗,t+1b,2 (t)
˜0b(t + 2)
βt = RPb − xˆ(t)
RPb − xˇ(t)
The optimal actions of b at time point t and of s at time point t + 1 are:
σ ∗
ˆb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) xˆ(t − 1)
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
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˜b,i (t)
(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept if σs(t − 1) xˇ(t − 1){
accept 1 − αti
offer(xˇ(t)) αti
if xˇ(t − 1) < σs(t − 1) (xˆ(t))←b{
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − αti
offer(xˇ(t)) αti
otherwise
σ ∗
ˇb(t)
(t) =
{
accept if σs(t − 1) (xˇ(t))←b
offer(xˇ(t)) otherwise
σ ∗s (t + 1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
accept if σb(t) xˆ(t){
offer((xˆ(t + 2))←b) βt
offer(xˆ(t)) 1 − βt if xˆ(t) > σb(t) > xˇ(t)
offer(xˆ(t)) otherwise
The system of beliefs can be trivially obtained extending that of choice rule 1.
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